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THE BOARD OF EDITORS
OF THE
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Dedicates Volume LI
to the Memory of
PROFESSOR LEONARD F. MANNING
ALPIN J. CAMERON PROFESSOR OF LAW
Professor Manning served as Faculty Advisor to the Law Review
from 1954 to 1983 with unsurpassed distinction. One measure of the
man is the measure of those who come to honor him. On the following
pages, four Deans of Fordham Law School who served during Profes-
sor Manning's tenure pay tribute to him. The Honorable William
Hughes Mulligan, former judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, served as Dean from 1956 to 1971. The Honor-
able Joseph M. McLaughlin, United States District Court Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, was Dean from 1971 to 1981.
Professor Joseph M. Perillo, a noted commentator in the field of
contracts law, served as Acting Dean from 1981 to 1982. The present
Dean, John D. Feerick, took office in 1982. Dean Feerick is well
known for his role in the writing and passage of the 25th Amendment
to the United States Constitution. As students, both Judge
McLaughlin and Dean Feerick served as Editor-in-Chief of the Ford-
ham Law Review under the guidance of Leonard F. Manning.
i~i ,ii'ii~ii ,   ' I,
LEONARD F. MANNING-
"BOYS WILL BE BOYS"
I first met Len Manning in the fall of 1939 when we entered
Fordham Law School, which was then located in the Woolworth
Building, as Morning Division students. Len lived and worked in New
Jersey, so I did not get to know him too well in school-only well
enough to recognize that he had a quick, penetrating mind and a
capacity to express his views on the law or any other subject articu-
lately, on occasion, even passionately.
The times were indeed discouraging. At home, the depression was
in full swing. Although nominally full-time students, just about all of
our classmates were working in law firms or other related businesses
in order to pay a modest tuition and buy an occasional hot meal and a
few beers. Abroad, the rumors of war became reality. Hitler had
invaded Poland, and early in our third year Pearl Harbor was at-
tacked. Len left school to join the Coast Guard, and eventually served
in the Pacific. He took his third year at the Harvard Law School after
the war and graduated cum laude. Harvard sensibly gave Len full
credit for his Fordham grades, which were excellent.
I joined the faculty in September, 1946 after service in the Army
and a brief stint in practice. Len joined us in 1948. We had adjoining
offices at 302 Broadway, and despite the limited space, battered
furniture and meager paychecks, we were enthusiasts for the School,
its students, and our faculty colleagues. Len was and remained
throughout his long career at the Law School an intense teacher
thoroughly versed in his subject and fully devoted to his students. His
particular favorites, of course, were those on the Law Review staff
whom he always sought to protect and extol no matter what the
circumstance.
When the new building at Lincoln Center was finally occupied,
some editors at a late night session, overcome by deadlines and per-
haps a few beers, decided to play some baseball in the sparkling new
offices. A few windows were cracked and as the new Dean and
Warden, I was shocked at the wanton destruction of property-about
$10 worth. I remonstrated Len and his answer was simply "Boys Will
Be Boys." In fact the players presented him with a trophy consisting of
a golden replica of a baseball field with each editor's name engraved
at his position. It was entitled simply "Boys Will Be Boys." It was one
of Len's proudest possessions, and as time went on I became proud to
have played such a villainous role in making it possible.
Len was a loving husband and father, staunchly dedicated to his
family. Next to the Law School and the Law Review he was dedicated
to Gilbert and Sullivan, the Greek playrights he studied in his Jesuit
high school and college days, and Jersey City politics. He was a boon
companion, an ardent espouser of causes, and a skilled debater. We,
his colleagues of the past, will always remember him with affection
and esteem.
HON. WILLIAM HUGHES MULLIGAN
LEONARD F. MANNING-A TRIBUTE
We are given memories so that we may have roses in December. My
reminiscences of Leonard Manning date back to 1954 when he was
my teacher. There is a short gap between 1959 and 1961, while I
fumbled around in the practice of law, and then I came to know Len
as a colleague (never quite his equal) on the faculty. The ultimate
absurdity, of course, was that I became his titular boss when I became
Dean of the Law School in 1971. In all these roles he masked his
imposing intellect in the most unassuming demeanor. Truly, he was
suaviter in modo, fortiter in re. *
Len was never a big man. I doubt that he ever had 150 pounds on
his five foot seven frame. Yet he commanded a classroom as few others
could. Perched on the corner of his desk, he was an exclamation point.
With few notes and only the skimpiest of outlines he would sweep
across a point, enshrouding it in the case law ("But isn't that the very
point of Justice Harlan's concurrence in Dutton v. Evans?") and then
at the close of the hour, when matters were at their darkest, he would
introduce the dawn ("Isn't the test just one of reasonableness? Isn't it
all due process?").
His capacity to leap lyrically from case to case was legendary,
admired by the well-prepared, equally feared by the unprepared
student. A young law student's mind, having been stretched by Profes-
sor Manning's questions, never contracted to its original proportions.
Yet, he was always gentle. I have never seen or heard of a student who
had felt skewered by a Manning attack.
Unlike most other great teachers I have known, Len Manning could
also write. My God, could he write! In the early days of the Fordham
Law Review when lead articles were hard to find, I served as Editor-
in-Chief of the Review. Professor Manning was moderator. Although
the second issue of the Volume was already shy an article, I recall how
troubled he was by an article we were about to publish on state action
and the due process clause.' Rather than scotch the article- a power
faculty moderators once had-he took pen in hand and, in a matter of
ten days, he composed a rebuttal2 that was as well-written and well-
footnoted as any I have ever read.
He had a passion for words. He would go through countless drafts,
sifting words and phrases until he had forged the perfect sentence to
convey his idea. He was perhaps at his best reviewing the books of
those with whom he disagreed. Ever gentle, but still capable of the
*Smoothly in style, strongly in substance
1. Morse, Policy and the Fourteenth Amendment: A New Semantics, 27 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 187 (1958).
2. Manning, State Responsibility Under the Fourteenth Amendment: An Ad-
herence To Tradition, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 201 (1958).
DEDICATION
rapier thrust, he went after Justice William 0. Douglas who had just
published The Right of The People. Said Manning, ". . . God has
given William 0. Douglas ... many gifts. Silence is not one of
them." 3
As did fledgling law teachers in those days, Len Manning taught all
over the curriculum. Agency, Introduction to Pleading, Bills and
Notes (as it was then known) and several other courses commanded his
attention. But it was in Constitutional Law and, to a lesser extent,
Conflict of Laws that he finally dedicated his considerable energies.
He wrote extensively in both fields and his volume on Church-State
Relations, 4 published in 1981 as part of the Nutshell series, has already
become a classic.
Apropos classics, Professor Manning attributed much of his analyti-
cal skills and writing flair to his classical education. In his nostalgic
hours-and at Fordham Law School there seem to be many such
hours-he would recall with a fondness approaching reverence his
early mentor, Father John Larkin, S.J. It was Father Larkin who, in
the grand tradition of the Jesuits, had introduced Len at St. Peter's
College to the rhetoric of Cicero, the syllogisms of Aristotle, and the
poetry of Catullus. Len never forgot those lessons, and he could drop
quotations from ancient Greece and Rome to all who would listen. He
was equally at home with Gilbert and Sullivan and his renditions
from Trial By Jury could be heard by all, whether they would listen or
not.
I graduated from the Law School in 1959, and maintained only
desultory contact with Len Manning for two years. At that point I
received a gracious offer to join the faculty. It was never an aspiration
that I had consciously harbored, and I was torn between the rewards
of practice and the lure of academic life. Len, who had faced the same
dilemma when he was a young associate at Chadbourne, Parke,
Whiteside & Wolff, counselled me to accept the offer; and I have
never regretted it.
For ten years, as I labored in the vineyards of New York Practice
and Evidence, I constantly picked his fertile brain, particularly in
matters of jurisdiction. Years before Shaffer v. Heitner,5 he would
intimidate me with arguments like, "There is no in personam jurisdic-
tion. There is no in rem. There is only minimum contacts." He could
get apoplectic over Seider v. Roth.6 And he went to his grave in the
belief that CPLR 1006(g) is unconstitutional. I think he was wrong,
but if history is any guide, he will be vindicated. 7
3. Book Review, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 141 (1958).
4. L. Manning, The Law of Church-State Relations (1981).
5. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
6. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
7. Cf. Cordner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 234 F. Supp. 765, 770 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
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In 1971, I became Dean of the Law School and had to work on a
more mundane level with Len, particularly in his capacity as modera-
tor of the Law Review. Not surprisingly, he had difficulties with the
notion of a budget. Also not surprisingly, his resourceful mind could
find ways to juggle lines to keep the Review solvent. It has been my
experience-to paraphrase Lord Acton-that scholarly writing cor-
rupts; and law review writing corrupts absolutely. That was certainly
not true of the Fordham Law Review under Len's aegis. He read
every article before publication and graced the Review with a felicity
of style that became its hallmark during his twenty-eight year stew-
ardship.
No Dean ever had a more loyal faculty member. In matters of
principle he was as firm as an oak; in matters of detail, as flexible as a
willow. And, as his beau geste, he always let me make the characteri-
zation. His early days in Jersey City, the fiefdom of Boss Hague, had
instilled in him an appreciation of the need a Dean feels for a reliable
vote.
As might be expected, Manning's encyclopedic knowledge of Con-
stitutional Law and his limpid prose style were a magnet to the New
York Bar. Briefs came to him in droves, but he took only the most
interesting. He wrote a successful brief for the defendants in Wilder v.
Sugarman,8 upholding the New York statutes that permit the religious
matching of children in their placement away from home. Manning
appeared in that case on behalf of ten organizations which included a
composite of the largest single Protestant, Jewish and Catholic institu-
tions in the State of New York.
In 1979, he entered Harris v. McRae9 to support the Hyde Amend-
ment limiting the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abor-
tions under the Medicaid program. The case was assigned to United
States District Judge John Dooling, whose seat I now occupy and at
whose desk I am now writing this Tribute. Judge Dooling was unper-
suaded by the Manning brief, but it took him 214 pages to say so. The
case went directly to the United States Supreme Court 0 where it took
the Court only twenty-seven pages to see the wisdom of the Manning
approach. He was a great lawyer.
As Edwin Markham wrote at the death of Lincoln, "[A]nd when He
fell, in whirlwind He went down; As when a lordly cedar, green with
boughs, Goes down with a great shout upon the hills, and leaves a
lonesome place against the sky." There is a gaping void at the Law
School. It will not soon be filled.
VALE, CARISSIME AMICE!
HON. JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN
8. 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
9. 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
10. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
A REMEMBRANCE OF LEONARD F. MANNING
Twenty years ago, almost to the day, I made my first visit to
Fordham Law School to be interviewed by Dean William Hughes
Mulligan for a position on its faculty. At noon the Dean invited me to
join Professor Manning and him for lunch at Henry Stampler's
Steakhouse. That lunch is vividly recorded in my memory. The Dean,
who had already interviewed me, was mostly silent. Len Manning
and myself engaged in a wide-ranging conversation that showed many
facets of Len's personality and kaleidoscopic mind. Law, I think was
not mentioned. It was only later that I came to know the depth of his
legal knowledge and powers of analysis.
I had spent most of the two years preceding the interview in
Europe. Len brought me up to date as to what had happened on the
Broadway stage and which shows were worth seeing. This was the
quintessential Len Manning; friendly and helpful to a stranger while
demonstrating the broad spectrum of his interests. I learned of his
weekend vacations in the city with his beloved Ceil. I learned the
names and characteristics of each of the four sons who were always
near the forefront of his thoughts. I am certain that he recited at least
one verse of Byron (or was it Gilbert and Sullivan?). Yet, I was being
interviewed and he saw to it that I did most of the talking. Skillfully,
he drew me out on my professional aspirations, my recent marriage
and my literary tastes.
At the beginning of lunch, the Dean had asked if we would have a
drink. Len, for what he later told me was the first and last time in his
life, ordered sherry. I, as an insecure subject of an interview, followed
his lead and also ordered sherry for the first time in my life. The
Dean, as was his wont, ordered stronger stuff. Later that afternoon,
the Dean told some of the senior faculty that Perillo had interviewed
well, "but he drinks sherry." Fortunately for me, in a spasm of
tolerance, he overlooked this perception.
The relevance of this anecdote to this memoir of Len Manning is
perhaps tangential, but it does illustrate another trait of this delightful
friend. He was always doing something for the first time in his life. He
thrived on change. He shunned rigidity. As the school changed he
oversaw numerous changes in the constitution of the Law Review, the
number of issues printed and its editorial content. Some of his contri-
butions to the growth of the Law Review are detailed in a tribute to
him by the editors of Volume 49 of the Review.
Although many readers may know Len Manning primarily as mod-
erator of the Law Review his main professional interest was the
classroom. Before he wrote an article or took on a brief, he would ask,
"How will this help me in the classroom?" This is the kind of ethos
that has given Fordham Law School a strength that is far greater than
one would predict from an analysis of its financial resources. It is an
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ethos that Len did much to propagate in myself and in others on the
faculty.
I have been asked to contribute this remembrance because of my
former position as the Law School's Acting Dean. Yet, it is from the
perspective of Len Manning as my mentor, my friend, that I compose
these words. Since that initial lunch, no social gathering of the Ford-
ham law faculty has or can seem complete to me without a recitation
of poetry from Len. Since that initial lunch I can recall no conversa-
tion with him where his friendly concern for my well-being was not
palpable. As Professor John Calamari wrote while Len was still with
us, "[Hie loves everyone with whom he comes into contact. I do not
believe that the man has ever harbored an evil or selfish thought. He is
a friend sans pareil."
PROFESSOR JOSEPH M. PERILLO
IN MEMORIAM: LEONARD F. MANNING*
It is a privilege and honor to deliver these brief remarks in memory
of Leonard Manning who had a tremendous impact on many of our
lives.
The death of a good person is an occasion, not for mourning, but
for celebrating. A life has been completed, a journey finished, a job
done. Bishop Fulton J. Sheen has said, "If our lives just 'end,' our
friends will ask: 'How much did he leave?' But if our life is 'finished'
our friends will ask: 'How much did he take with him?'" What a
person takes with him is in direct proportion to what he has given
away during his lifetime.
Len Manning was a superb example of a human being who con-
stantly and continually poured himself out for others. Those who have
assembled here today know that they contain within themselves a part
of him. He gave of himself to help make them what they are. Where
might they be today without his encouragement, optimism, concern,
enthusiasm, guidance-in a word: LOVE? It is the love of friends
such as Len Manning that sustains us and keeps us going in the journey
of life.
As today's readings reflect, there is only one law that counts in the
long run and that is the law of love. What we sometimes forget when
we speak of love is that love costs. It involves sacrifice. To give time,
effort and energy to someone is to give up having that time, effort and
energy for ourselves and our own pursuits. However, the more we
give, the more joy-filled we become. Perhaps that explains Len's
contagious cheerfulness and exuberance as well as his pervading opti-
mism and enthusiasm. He was truly spirit-filled-full of the joy of
living and giving. I do not think there was ever a person he did not
like or for whom he did not have a kind word.
It is not possible in these brief remarks to sum up the life of a man
like Len Manning. Generations of Fordham law students have known
him as a brilliant teacher and scholar. No person ever loved the
students of Fordham Law School more than he did. I can see him now
sitting on the classroom desk at 302 Broadway without any notes and
with his arms folded across his chest speaking in a relaxed tone about
the cases assigned the previous week. He stretched our minds by
asking, but never answering, what the cases meant and when we were
about to reach a conclusion, he would introduce another element
which made the conclusion less clear.
Twenty-eight Boards of Editors of the Fordham Law Review-
each Board for some strange reason the best ever-have known him as
a mentor and advisor who would go to any length for his students. To
*Eulogy delivered at a Memorial Mass, Church of St. Paul the Apostle, Febru-
ary 1, 1983.
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his faculty colleagues he was a cherished friend. But in all things it
was Len's humanity that towered over all his accomplishments.
Whether arguing a point of law or discussing Gilbert and Sullivan
there was a warmth and gentleness that permeated his very being. He
was intensely alive. He was a devoted husband and father whose
family was at the very center and core of his existence. He would
speak with love and pride of the Point Lookout Little League he
founded; of the lives and accomplishments of his four boys; of the
family trips to the Poconos; and always of his beloved Ceil. Len ended
many gatherings with the refrain "Mary C. I Love You."
Although small in physical stature, Len was eager and willing to
take on everyone's problems. He was never too busy or tired for a
friend whether it was a question of a "parking ticket" or where a son
or daughter should go to school. He gave considerable time and
energy to civic and charitable activities. He was steadfast in protect-
ing the character of the tiny town in which he spent nearly half his
life. He was devoted to his Church, spending endless hours on fund
raising and defending federal and state aid to parochial schools. He
was a man of the highest integrity and principle, loyal to the ideals
ingrained in him by the Jesuits at St. Peter's Prep and St. Peter's
College.
It is said that a person is a success if he has "lived well, laughed
often and loved much; gained the respect of intelligent men and the
love of children; filled his niche and accomplished his task; left the
world better than he found it; never lacked appreciation of earth's
beauty or failed to express it; looked for the best in others and given
the best he had."* Such a man was Len Manning. Len put into life
more than he took out and left the world better than he found it.
Happy are we who were blessed with the gift of his presence among
us! Let us thank God that we were privileged to know him.
DEAN JOHN D. FEERICK
*B. Anderson, Success, in Brown Book Magazine (1904).
FEDERAL INCOME TAX RULEMAKING:
AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
EDWARD YORIO*
INTRODUCTION
D URING the last two decades economic analysis has taken a lead-
ing place in the criticism of legal rules' with scholars evaluating
the rules of such diverse areas as antitrust,2 contracts3 and criminal
law 4 from the standpoint of economic efficiency.- With respect to the
federal income tax, however, analysis of the efficiency of applying
and administering provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) has
played a relatively minor role.6 The paucity of economic analyses of
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University;
B.A. 1968, Columbia University; J.D. 1971, Harvard University. The author
wishes to express his appreciation to Peter Assail, a student at Cardozo Law School,
for his research and editorial assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. Two trailblazing articles were published in the early 1960's. Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961); Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). Since then, the outpouring of
scholarly literature has been relentless. Perhaps the most influential, and probably
the most cited, books are G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970) and R.A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed. 1977).
2. See, e.g., R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (1976).
3. See, e.g., The Economics of Contract Law (A. Kronman and R. Posner eds.
1979).
4. See, e.g., G. Tullock, The Logic of the Law, 151-249 (1971); Becker, Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).
5. Many scholars have challenged the idea that efficiency should be the pri-
mary-or even an important-goal of the legal system. See, e.g., Buchanan, Good
Economics-Bad Law, 60 Va. L. Rev. 483 (1974); Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J.
Legal Stud. 191 (1980); Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9
J. Legal Stud. 227 (1980); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about
Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451 (1974); Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and
Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 307 (1979). Professors Calabresi
and Posner have responded to this criticism. Calabresi, About Law and Economics:
A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 553 (1980); Posner, The Ethical and
Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L.
Rev. 487 (1980); Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kron-
man, 9 J. Legal Stud. 243 (1980). Professor Dworkin has in turn responded to both.
Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 563 (1980).
6. Only a limited amount of scholarship exists in the area. One book discusses
federal income tax simplification in a general way, but with minimal economic
analysis. C.H. Gustafson, Federal Income Tax Simplification (1979). Professor
Posner devotes a brief section of his book to the federal income tax. R.A. Posner,
supra note 1, at 371-84. Other works include: G. Tullock, supra note 4, at 162-68
(analysis of optimum tax enforcement in dealing with tax evasion); Bittker, Equity,
Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, 16 San
Diego L. Rev. 735 (1979) (economic misallocations may eliminate inequities in the
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
income tax rules in both court decisions and legal scholarship should
not be surprising. After all, the income tax is designed to accomplish
objectives, such as raising revenue,7 redistributing income 8 and ensur-
ing equal treatment of similarly situated taxpayers, 9 that may conflict
with a desideratum of economic efficiency. Moreover, the mandates
of a complex, detailed and usually carefully drawn statute like the
Internal Revenue Code limit a court's freedom to develop rules that
maximize efficiency. In addition, the development of tax law usually
reflects an ongoing struggle between taxpayers and the government
over externally fixed resources: What one group gains, the other
loses. 10 As a consequence, conflicts between taxpayers and the govern-
federal income tax); Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statu-
tory Evolution and Reform, 87 Yale L.J. 90, 93 (1977) (reforms of corporate tax rules
would reduce legal costs); Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 Yale
L.J. 472, 507-10 (1980) (income tax may be an inefficient method of achieving
redistribution); Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal
Rulemaking; Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation,
71 Am. Econ. Rev. 414 (1981) (non-tax legal rules ought to be selected on the basis of
allocative efficiency, not redistributve effects).
7. If, for example, the maximum marginal income tax rate were 15%, taxpay-
ers would have less incentive to devise plans to avoid the tax. Since the costs of
devising these schemes and of legislating and administering against them are high,
the federal income tax system would generate lower costs if the maximum rate were
15 %, but the price of such efficiency would be a substantial loss in revenue.
8. A proportional tax of 25% might generate as much revenue as the current
graduated tax rates and would lower the costs associated with tax-avoidance plans.
The price of reducing these transaction costs would be a reduction in the amount of
redistribution. Of course, economic analysis may be helpful in determining the most
efficient method of achieving a redistributive goal. See Kronman, supra note 6, at
507-10.
9. If the federal income tax were assessed only on income on which withholding
for the tax is practicable, the overall costs of administering the system might be less.
But the result of narrowing the tax base to that type of income would be unequal
treatment of salaried employees and of those taxpayers not subject to withholding.
For a discussion of the trade-off between tax simplification and distributional equity,
see Coven, The Decline and Fall of Taxable Income, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1525, 1534-
36, 1560-63 (1981).
10. To put it another way, the pattern of development in tax law may not be in
accord with a natural selection of Pareto-superior outcomes. An equilibrium state in
which some people could be made better off only by making others worse off is called
a "Pareto Optimum" state. If one person's situation can be improved without causing
a loss to anyone else, a clear societal gain will occur, producing a "Pareto-superior"
outcome. See J. Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications 438-46 (1976). Many
primary legal developments seem to conform with the selection of Pareto-superior
outcomes. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1094 (1972)
(discussion of the efficiency of certain remedies in tort and property law); infra
sources cited in note 12. This does not appear to be true of developments in federal
income tax law, however. See Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution,
90 Yale L.J. 1238, 1255-56 (1981).
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ment are likely to produce cumulative complexity of legal rules with-
out offsetting efficiency gains."
Despite these qualifications, this Article argues that efficiency crite-
ria are more relevant to choosing among rules of federal income
taxation 12 than has been previously understood.13 The Article shows
how courts should interpret particular provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code to achieve its goals most efficiently. 4 Three specific prob-
lems in federal income taxation are examined: the definition of a
capital asset as it relates to cases in which a taxpayer's motive for
holding property has changed over time; the substantiation of deduc-
tions and credits; and the meaning of the word "gift." This Article
demonstrates that courts have adopted rules in response to each prob-
lem that are inefficient, and argues that alternative rules, which are
almost certainly more efficient and at least as fair, should have been
11. See Clark, supra note 10, at 1255-56.
12. Some scholars have argued that the common law unconsciously and inevita-
bly develops more efficient legal rules. See, e.g., Goodman, An Economic Theory of
the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. Legal Stud. 393 (1978); Priest, The Common
Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. Legal Stud. 65 (1977). These
evolutionary theories have been challenged, however. See, e.g., Clark, supra note
10, at 1265-72; Cooter & Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the
Help of Judges?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 139 (1980). In any event, what may be true of
common-law rules does not appear to be true of federal income tax rules, which tend
to become more complex and less efficient. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying
text. Thus, it is necessary to pursue efficiency goals consciously and systematically
under the income tax laws rather than rely on an automatic "natural selection"
process.
13. This is not to say that economic factors are not now at work, sometimes
implicitly, in the income tax system. For example, the annual accounting principle,
which in general precludes reopening the return of a prior tax year, has been
explained in terms of the needs of practical income tax administration. Burnet v.
Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 364-65 (1931); Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v.
United States, 381 F.2d 399, 403 (Ct. C1. 1967). That imputed income is not taxed
under current law is at least partly due to the difficulty of valuing such income. H.C.
Simons, Personal Income Taxation 52-53 (1938). The zero bracket amount, I.R.C.
§ 63 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), which essentially allows a taxpayer to deduct a flat
amount in lieu of itemizing his personal deductions, is defensible in part on the
grounds that it minimizes costs in preparing and auditing tax returns. See S. Rep. No.
66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977). For a criticism of the zero bracket amount on the
grounds that it unjustifiably sacrifices distributional equity for the sake of income tax
simplification, see Coven, supra note 9, at 1560-63.
14. This Article accepts, therefore, without making any value judgment, what-
ever policy underlies a particular statutory provision-be it wealth maximization,
raising revenue, equality of tax treatment, or redistribution. The main focus
throughout is on the way in which courts can most efficiently carry out the mandate
of a statutory provision, not on whether the provision maximizes wealth. This
emphasis on process efficiency enables the author to skirt the conflict between the
legal economists and their adversaries, see supra note 5, because it is unlikely that
anyone would challenge the desirability of efficiency in the federal income tax
process. But see Tullock, Two Kinds of Legal Efficiency, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 659, 659-
61 (1980) (poor enforcement may be preferable if law itself is undesirable).
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adopted instead. 15 Drawing on this analysis, the Article makes a
number of recommendations through which Congress and courts can
more generally minimize costs in the formulation, application and
administration of the rules of federal income taxation.
I. SALES OF REAL ESTATE AND THE CAPITAL ASSET DEFINITION
A. Outline of the Problem
Section 1221 of the Code defines the term "capital asset" to mean all
"property held by the taxpayer,"'1 excluding, inter alia, property held
"primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business." 17 Falling within this exclusion and thus failing to qualify as
a capital asset has significant tax consequences: 8 If the property were
a capital asset, any gain upon sale would be taxed at a favorable rate,
approximately forty percent of the rate on ordinary income. ' The
legislative purpose of reduced taxation of capital gains, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, is to favor " 'appreciation in value accrued
over a substantial period of time' " as differentiated from that" 'aris-
ing from the everyday operation of a business.' "20
The problem of deciding whether to classify a particular asset as a
capital asset is complicated when the taxpayer's purpose for owning
the asset changes over time. By way of illustration, suppose:
15. Some of the author's conclusions must remain somewhat tentative in the
absence of exhaustive empirical research. See infra notes 111-12, 115, 148, 162 and
accompanying text. But the empirical evidence that is currently available does sup-
port the conclusions in the text. See infra notes 31-32, 36, 102, 112, 114, 121, 158-59,
167, 169, 176, 178, 180 and accompanying text.
16. I.R.C. § 1221 (1976).
17. Id. § 1221(1). Section 1231(b)(1)(B) of the Code similarly excludes from the
definition of "property used in the trade or business" "property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business." Id.
§ 1231(b) (1) (B) (1976). Since the language of § 1221(1) and § 1231(b)(1)(B) is identi-
cal, whatever is proposed in the remainder of the Article with respect to § 1221(1) is
also germane to § 1231(b)(1)(B).
18. But see § 1237(a) of the Code, which provides a safe harbor of capital gain
treatment for certain taxpayers.
19. Sixty percent of a taxpayer's net capital gain is deductible from gross income.
I.R.C. § 1202(a) (1976). For some taxpayers, capital gains are also subject to the
alternative minimum tax. Id. § 55(a).
20. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966) (per curiam) (quoting Commis-
sioner v. Gillette Motor Transp. Co., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960) and Corn Products
Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955)). Although this may be something
of an oversimplification, the Court's distinction is basically valid for the purpose of
analysis of the problem considered in this Article. See Bernstein, "Primarily for Sale":
A Semantic Snare, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1093, 1093 n. 1 (1968). For a fuller treatment of
this business/investment dichotomy, see Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital
Gains Taxation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 985, 989-99 (1956).
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John Connor bought a forty-eight-acre tract of exurban real
estate in 1972 for $10,000. Connor, who thought real estate was the
best investment he could make at the time, intended to keep the
property at least until he retired. In 1977 he was ready to retire,
and he sought a purchaser for the real estate. Although he found a
few prospective buyers who were willing to pay about $50,000, he
spoke to a local real estate broker who told him that the value of
the land was temporarily deflated because high interest costs made
it unattractive to developers. The broker advised Connor to subdi-
vide the property into three-acre lots, to improve it with sewers and
roads, and to sell the lots to individuals. Connor took the broker's
advice, subdivided and substantially improved half of the property
in 1977, and sold eight three-acre lots from 1978 through 1981 to
purchasers who saw his advertisements in local newspapers. The
total proceeds of these sales, net the cost of the improvements, was
$45,000. Connor is now seeking a purchaser for the remaining
twenty-four-acre tract.
Was the real estate sold by Connor "held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business," thereby
making the gain from the sale ineligible for capital gains treatment?
For the years between 1972 and 1977, the answer is clearly no because
during that period Connor held the land as an investment and had no
real estate business; after 1977, the answer is less certain. 21 The fairest
result, and the result most in accord with the congressional purpose in
providing preferential treatment of capital gains, is to allow Connor
capital gains treatment on the appreciation in value between 1972 and
1977, but to tax his profits after that date as ordinary income.22
Although leading scholars2 3 and a respected Tax Court judge24 recog-
nize that this is the proper result in cases involving a change of
purpose by the taxpayer, no court has approved bifurcation of the
taxpayer's gain into capital gain and ordinary income elements. In-
stead, courts try to fit the entire gain in a procrustean bed of either
capital gain or ordinary income.25
21. See infra text accompanying notes 26-35.
22. Connor cannot moor within the safe harbor provided by § 1237(a) of the
Code because he substantially improved the property and had not held the tract for
ten years before sale. See I.R.C. § 1237(a)(2), (b)(3) (1976).
23. 1 S. Surrey, W. Warren, P. McDaniel & H. Ault, Federal Income Taxation
1012 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1 S. Surrey]; ALI, Definitional Problems in Capital
Gains Taxation 33-35, 92-96 (Discussion Draft 1960) (hereinafter cited as "ALI
Draft"); Freedman & Solomon, Tax Consequences on the Sale of Real Estate-A
New Approach, 19 U. So. Calif. Tax Inst. 281, 295 (1967).
24. Bynum v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 295, 302 (1966) (Tannenwald, J., concur-
ring). But see Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1954).
25. One court specifically rejected a taxpayer's request to bifurcate his gain.
Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 423 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 819 (1976).
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A court today may begin its analysis of Connor's case by stating that
whether the property was held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of a trade or business depends upon an evaluation of
all the facts. 26 The court may then consider a list of up to nine
factors27 to determine whether the property falls within the exclusion:
(1) the purpose of the taxpayer's acquisition of the property; (2) the
extent of the taxpayer's sales activity; (3) the frequency, continuity
and substantiality of the sales; (4) the extent of subdividing and devel-
oping; (5) the use of a business office; (6) the duration of the taxpayer's
ownership; (7) the use of real estate brokers to facilitate sales; (8) the
substantiality of the income derived from the sales and its percentage
of the taxpayer's total income; and (9) the extent of sales promotion
activity such as advertising. 2 The court may then assert that none of
these factors is "necessarily decisive, and some weigh more heavily
than others. ' 29 Or the court may state that "each case must be decided
on its own peculiar facts, and specific factors or combinations of them
are not necessarily controlling." 30
In light of the multitude of relevant criteria, 31 it is difficult to
predict how Connor would fare in an attempt to obtain capital gains
treatment on the sales.32 In his favor are the facts that he bought the
property and held it for five years as an investment; that he made only
26. Id. at 415; United States v. Burket, 402 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1968); Eline
Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1, 5 (1960).
27. Five factors were considered in Eline Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.
1, 5 (1960); six factors in Howell v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 546, 554 (1972); seven
factors in United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 910 (5th Cir. 1969); and nine
factors in Gault v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1964).
28. Factors (1)-(5) are taken from United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 910
(5th Cir. 1969); factor (6) is taken from Howell v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 546, 554
(1972); factors (6)-(9) are found in Gault v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir.
1964).
29. Gault v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1964).
30. United States v. Burket, 402 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1968).
31. The preceding discussion is not even the tip of the iceberg of what courts have
said about the § 1221(1) exclusion. The purpose of this Article is not to try to
reconcile the judicial pronouncements. At least one court has stated that a reconcilia-
tion is impossible: "Over the past 40 years, this case by case approach with its
concentration on the facts of each suit has resulted in a collection of decisions not
always reconcilable .... [E]fforts to distinguish and thereby make consistent the
Court's previous holdings must necessarily be 'foreboding and unrewarding."'
Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 414-15 (5th Cir.) (quoting
Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122, 127 (5th Cir. 1963)), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 819 (1976). For a fuller discussion and analysis of the case law, see Bernstein,
supra note 20, at 1098-1109; Freedman & Solomon, supra note 23, at 307-56.
32. One commentator offered this advice to lawyers: "If a client asks in any but
an extreme case whether, in your opinion, his sale will result in capital gain, your
answer should probably be, 'I don't know, and no one else in town can tell you.'
J.L. Wood, Address to the Los Angeles Bar Association Tax Committee (1957),
reprinted in 35 Taxes 804, 806 (1957).
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eight sales during a four year period; that he did not have a real estate
office; and that he preferred, and initially tried, to sell to only one
purchaser. Against him are the facts that he subdivided and developed
half of his holdings; 33 that he pursued a consistent sales program; that
he advertised to promote sales; and that his income from the sales was
not insubstantial. Many of the factors are offsetting. As a formal
matter, the outcome of litigation in this area ostensibly depends on
which of the factors the court weighs most heavily. 34 Realistically, the
result may often depend on the court's intuitive sense of the merits of
the taxpayer's claim .35
The present state of the law in this area is a morass of confusion and
uncertainty. 3 Whether the courts can devise a workable alternative is
another matter. Although a rule of dual treatment is more accurate
and more consonant with the underlying purpose of capital gains
treatment, even its advocates doubt whether the statute allows it 37
and whether it is administratively feasible. 38 With regard to the latter
33. Although subdivision and development are not per se fatal, Estate of Barrios
v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1959), they can hurt a lot. See United
States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 911 (5th Cir. 1969).
34. See Bernstein, supra note 20, at 1098-99. In holding for the government in
Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 819 (1976), for example, the court heavily weighed the frequency of sales and
the taxpayer's activities in improving the property and discounted the taxpayer's
prior investment motive. Id. at 416-18, 420-22.
35. The classic statement on statutory interpretation by an American realist is
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1930). When a court in a
particularly unsettled area of the law adopts a multifactor balancing test, delicately
weighs one factor against another, and then announces the result of this magical and
mysterious process, one is reminded of this passage by Professor Radin:
But since a choice implies motives, it is obvious that, somewhere, somehow, a
judge is impelled to make his selection . . . by those psychical elements which
make him the kind of person that he is. That this is pure subjectivism ... is
beside the point. It is hard to see how subjectivism can be avoided or how the
personality of the judge can be made to count for nothing in his decision on
statutory interpretation as on everything else.
Id. at 881; accord Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 397-
400 (1950). For a strong criticism of Radin's position, see Landis, A Note on "Statu-
tory Interpretation," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886 (1930).
36. "With each court left to its own devices, it was most unlikely that a workable
set of general principles would evolve, and they did not." Weithorn, Subdivisions of
Real Estate- "Dealer" v. "Investor" Problem, 11 Tax. L. Rev. 157, 157 (1956). See
infra note 114.
37. Bynum v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 295, 302 (1966) (Tannenwald, J., concur-
ring); 1 S. Surrey, supra note 23, at 1012; Freedman & Solomon, supra note 23, at
297.
38. "Clearly, this approach [bifurcation] would have its difficulties, such as
determining the point of time at which the period of investment is to terminate and
then to ascertain the value of the property at that time." 1 S. Surrey, supra note 23,
at 1012.
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issue, this Article demonstrates that the multifactor tests which the
courts currently use are themselves extremely costly, and that a dual
treatment rule, in addition to producing a more accurate result, is
actually a more efficient method of resolving cases that involve a
change of purpose by the taxpayer.3 9 Before proceeding with this
economic analysis, however, it is necessary first to establish that the
language and purpose of section 1221(1) allow a court to bifurcate a
taxpayer's gain into capital gain and ordinary income.
B. The Problem of Statutory Construction
Whether the language or the legislative purpose40 of section 1221(1)
permits a court to bifurcate a taxpayer's gain into capital gain and
ordinary income in cases involving a taxpayer change of purpose is a
complex question. The language of section 1221(1), taken as a
whole, 41 suggests that the principal distinction Congress intended to
draw by means of the exclusion was between profits or losses arising
from the everyday operations of a business and profits or losses arising
from an investment such as stock or real estate.42 Use of the phrases
"inventory," "stock in trade" and "ordinary course of his trade or
business" indicates that Congress regards capital asset treatment as
inappropriate for assets regularly sold in a business. Conversely, the
statute implies that gains on investment property normally merit capi-
tal gains treatment.
The legislative history of the clause "property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or
business" reinforces the dichotomy between ordinary sales of property
in a business and sales of investment property. The clause is the
39. The author's proposals are not relevant to cases under § 1221(1) that involve
a dual purpose or an undecided purpose on the part of the taxpayer. See Bernstein,
supra note 20, at 1102-09.
40. Eminent scholars deny the existence, determinability and relevance of legis-
lative intent or purpose in the interpretation of statutes. See, e.g., Radin, supra note
35, at 869-73. But since judicial decisions regularly refer to legislative intent or
purpose, as Radin admits, it is important to determine, if possible, the legislative
purpose underlying a statutory provision. One distinguished judge regards the discov-
ery of legislative purpose as "one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed
jurisprudence." Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), afJ'd,
326 U.S. 404 (1945).
41. For an argument that individual words in the Code should be interpreted in
light of the context in which they appear, see Griswold, Foreword: Of Time and
Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 89 (1960) (mean-
ing of the word "gift"). Judge Learned Hand has made the point most eloquently:
"[T]he meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a
melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate
recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create."
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
42. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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composite result of two amendments that Congress inserted in the
exclusion in 1924 and 1934. 43 The earlier amendment was enacted to
preclude real estate dealers from obtaining capital gains on sales of
real estate in the course of a real estate business;44 the later amend-
ment was designed to forestall securities traders from receiving ordi-
nary loss treatment on sales of investments in stocks or bonds during
the Depression. 45 The legislative history thus confirms what the lan-
guage of the statute suggests, that the purpose of the exclusion is to
draw a distinction between business property and investment prop-
erty, with sales of the former treated as ordinary income (or loss) and
sales of the latter treated as capital gain (or loss). The history of the
operative clause further suggests that courts are free to use this busi-
ness versus investment distinction in formulating rules under section
1221(1).41 One means of buttressing that distinction would be for a
court to bifurcate a taxpayer's gain on the sale of subdivided real
43. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680, 714 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1221
(1976)); Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 263 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1221
(1976)). Prior to these amendments, the full text of the provision was:
(6) The term 'capital assets' as used in this section means property acquired
and held by the taxpayer for profit or investment for more than two years
(whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include
property held for the personal use or consumption of the taxpayer or his
family, or stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which
would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at
the close of the taxable year.
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 233 (emphasis added).
44. Since real estate dealers were not permitted to inventory real estate held for
sale, the pre-1924 exclusion did not apply to real estate held by a dealer for sale. See
Phipps v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 1293, 1297 (1930), rev'd on other grounds, 54
F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1931); O.D. 848, 4 C.B. 47 (1921). Real estate dealers were thus
able to enjoy capital gains treatment on sales of real estate. To eliminate this
unintended tax benefit, Congress amended the exclusion to extend to "property held
by the taxpayer primarily for sale in the course of his trade or business." Revenue Act
of 1924, ch. 234, § 208(a)(8), 43 Stat. 253, 263. The House and Senate reports
explained that the purpose of the amendment was "to remove any doubt as to
whether property which is held primarily for resale constitutes a capital asset." H.R.
Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1, pt. 2, C.B. 241,
255; S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1, pt. 2, C.B.
266, 281.
45. The 1934 amendment gave the exclusion its current form: "property held by
the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business." Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 117(b), 48 Stat. 680, 714. The addition of
the words "to customers" and "ordinary" was designed to prevent stock traders or
speculators from claiming ordinary loss deductions on sales of stock or securities. See
H.R. Rep. No. 1385, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1, pt. 2, C.B.
627, 632.
46. As Justice Holmes noted, "The Legislature has the power to decide what the
policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that
will should be recognized and obeyed." Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st
Cir. 1908).
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
property between the gain that accrued during an investment period
and the gain that accrued after subdivision or development.4 7
Perhaps the strongest objection to a rule of dual treatment is that
the language of the Code neither explicitly authorizes, nor implies,
that gain be bifurcated. The language of section 1221(1) in fact sug-
gests the opposite: Property seems to be either a capital asset or not a
capital asset, but not partially both. Under a literal reading of section
1221(1), therefore, a court might hold that gain could not be bifur-
cated. 48 Although an exhaustive inquiry into the doctrine of strict
construction of statutes is beyond the scope of analysis here, 49 a num-
47. Arguably, Congress rejected a judicial bifurcation approach when it enacted
§ 1237 of the Code of 1954. See Bernstein, supra note 20, at 1110-11. The section
grants capital gains treatment (under certain circumstances and to a limited extent)
for real property acquired by inheritance or for investment purposes, even though the
property is subdivided to facilitate sale. By enacting this safe harbor Congress argua-
bly acknowledged and accepted the rule that treats as ordinary income sales that in
the aggregate constitute a course of business at the time of sale, despite the taxpayer's
prior investment motive. The Senate Report observed that "an individual who subdi-
vides real property held for investment purposes is likely to be held a dealer and
subjected to ordinary income tax rates on the entire long-term gain." S. Rep. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 115, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4621,
4748 (1954).
Whether the enactment of § 1237 precludes a court from bifurcating a taxpayer's
gain under § 1221 (1) is doubtful. First, the regulations under § 1237 specifically state
that the "rule in section 1237 is not exclusive in its application." Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-
l(a)(4)(i) (1960). Second, the enactment of § 1237 indicates that Congress was so
concerned about cases that focused solely on the taxpayer's purpose at the time of sale
that it enacted a safe harbor to ensure taxpayers a way to avoid those cases. To be
sure, Congress would not have enacted § 1237 had the courts regularly bifurcated
gain under § 1221(1); § 1237 would have been unnecessary. But the fact that
Congress, in enacting § 1237, recognized the unfairness of subjecting to ordinary
income tax rates a taxpayer's "entire long-term gain" should encourage courts in a
change-of-purpose case to adopt a bifurcation approach that would more generally
remedy the unfairness. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
48. For an eloquent judicial statement of the virtues of strict construction, see
Gundry v. Pinniger, 1 D.G.M. & G. 502, 505, 42 Eng. Rep. 647, 648 (1852) ("[T]he
great cardinal rule is . . . to adhere as closely as possible to the literal meaning of the
words. When once you depart from that canon of construction you are launched into
a sea of difficulties which it is difficult to fathom.").
49. Dean Pound attacked the doctrine of strict construction in a famous and
fascinating historical, political, sociological and legal essay. Pound, Common Law
and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1908). He summarizes his conclusions about
strict construction in this way:
It is not difficult to show, however, that it is not necessary to and inherent
in a legal system; that it is not an ancient and fundamental doctrine of the
common law; that it had its origin in archaic notions of interpretation
generally, now obsolete, and survived in its present form because of judicial
jealousy of the reform movement; and that it is wholly inapplicable to and
out of place in American law of today.
Id. at 388. After this Article was written, the author became aware of an important
recent contribution to the literature on the role of the judiciary in updating obsolete
legislation. See G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982).
INCOME TAX RULEMAKING
ber of arguments suggest that section 1221(1) of the Code need not be
construed literally. Strict construction of statutes is most often de-
fended on one of three grounds: (1) It increases certainty in the
administration of statutes; 50 (2) it encourages legislative bodies to be
more careful and precise in drafting statutory language; 51 or (3) it
prevents courts from usurping powers that properly belong to the
legislature.52
Although certainty may be increased by strictly construing the
language of some statutes, absolute certainty is sometimes a vain
illusion with even the most detailed and precise statutory language. 53
As Justice Holmes aptly wrote:
It is not true that in practice (and I know no reason why theory
should disagree with the facts) a given word or even a given collo-
cation of words has one meaning and no other. A word generally
has several meanings, even in the dictionary. You have to consider
the sentence in which it stands to decide which of those meanings it
bears in the particular case, and very likely will see that it there has
a shade of significance more refined than any given in the word-
book.54
Particularly when a statutory provision contains words that are gen-
eral and open-ended, such as the phrases "primarily for sale" and
"ordinary course of his trade or business" in section 1221(1), the
interpreter must necessarily exercise discretion in applying the provi-
sion. 55
Empirical confirmation of this point may be found in the evolution
of the multifactor test under section 1221(1). In Malat v. Riddell,56 the
Supreme Court defined the word "primarily" to mean "of first impor-
tance" or "principally. ' 57 The Court sought to read the statute liter-
50. Silving, A Plea for a Law of Interpretation, 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 499, 518
(1950).
51. Davies, The Interpretation of Statutes in the Light of Their Policy by the
English Courts, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 519, 526-27 (1935); Silving, supra note 50, at
519.
52. Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: A Peek into the Mind and Will of a
Legislature, 50 Ind. L.J. 206, 215 (1975); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 545 (1947).
53. See Amos, The Interpretation of Statutes, 5 Cambridge L.J. 163, 175 (1934);
Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 407, 419-20 (1950).
54. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 417
(1899).
55. Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47
Colum. L. Rev. 1259, 1265-66 (1947); Radin, supra note 35, at 884. Employment of
general words may make it possible to adapt a statute to changing social needs.
Payne, The Intention of the Legislature in the Interpretation of Statutes, 9 Current
Legal Prob. 96 (1956).
56. 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
57. Id. at 572.
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ally and to impose its literal reading on subsequent decisions. Despite
this effort, certainty has not been achieved5 because Malat dealt with
words and not with the underlying statutory problem. 9 Indeed, the
continued ascendancy of nebulous multifactor tests in subsequent
cases highlights the failure to achieve certainty by adopting a literal
reading of the statutory language. 60
Other scholars have argued that strict construction serves a norma-
tive function.6' By adhering to a literal reading of statutory provi-
sions, courts supposedly can induce the legislature to be more careful
in drafting and enacting statutes in the future.62 Consequently, the
legal system in the long run will function more efficiently and with
greater certainty. The price, however, of trying to discipline the
legislature in this way is that some litigants may be denied the fairest
resolution of their cases. Moreover, legislative revision of a statute is
frequently more costly than liberal judicial interpretation to achieve
the proper result.6 3 Furthermore, because it is in practice difficult, if
not impossible, for a legislature to foresee every ramification of a
statute,6 4 judicial inflexibility for normative reasons in the interpreta-
58. Justice Frankfurter remarked: "[M]ere reading does not yield meaning....
because of the finitude of even the most piercing legislative imagination." Frank-
furter, Foreword-A Symposium on Statutory Construction, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 365,
367 (1950).
59. As one scholar explained, "In failing to provide any guidance for application
of the statutory language to various fact situations, the Supreme Court resolved little
and created several new problems." Bernstein, supra note 20, at 1109.
60. Subsequent decisions set aside the literalist approach endorsed by the Su-
preme Court in Malat. See, e.g., Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d
409, 422-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
61. See supra sources cited in note 51.
62. In Justice Frankfurter's words: "Judicial expansion of meaning beyond the
limits indicated is reprehensible because it encourages slipshodness in draftsmanship
and irresponsibility in legislation." Frankfurter, supra note 58, at 368. One senses in
Justice Frankfurter's argument the craftsman's pride in his own work and the expec-
tation, even insistence, that others-here the legislature-be equally expert.
63. On the inefficiency of deferring to the legislature, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 119-25.
64. Montaigne noted the futility of trying to pass laws governing the infinite
variety of human actions:
What have our legislators gained by selecting a hundred thousand particu-
lar cases and actions, and applying a hundred thousand laws to them? This
number bears no proportion to the infinite diversity of human actions.
Multiplication of our imaginary cases will never equal the variety of the real
examples. Add to them a hundred times as many more: and still no future
event will be found to correspond so exactly to any one of all the many,
many thousands of selected and recorded events that there will not remain
some circumstance, some difference, that will require separate consider-
ation in forming a judgment. There is little relation between our actions,
which are in perpetual mutation, and fixed and immutable laws.
The Complete Essays of Montaigne, Of Experience, 815-16 (D. Frame trans. 1958).
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tion of statutes may be unrealistic 65 as well as inefficient. In the
specific context of section 1221(1) of the Code, the normative argu-
ment has even less merit, for the language of that provision is well
suited to the legislative goals of taxing real estate dealers and securities
traders in a certain way.66 A narrow reading of that provision, there-
fore, will probably not induce Congress to be anymore careful than it
actually was.
6 7
A third theory invoked to justify strict construction of statutes is the
doctrine of separation of powers. According to this theory, a court
that construes a statute more broadly than a literal reading of the
language allows may be usurping the legislative power of Congress.
68
The scope of the separation of powers doctrine raises issues that are far
more complex than analysis here can solve, but a number of argu-
ments suggest that the doctrine should not preclude a court from
bifurcating a taxpayer's gain under section 1221(1). It should be
noted, preliminarily, that some eminent legal scholars, Professor Ra-
din foremost among them, reject the theory that the separation of
powers doctrine restricts the power of courts to interpret a statute
broadly.6 9 These scholars in fact argue just the opposite: Once a
legislature has enacted a statute, the interpretation of the language of
the statute belongs to the courts, not the legislature. The statute in a
sense takes on life of its own, separate from the will of the legisla-
ture.70 One scholar even suggests that deferring to the legislature after
the enactment of the statute may itself violate the separation of
powers doctrine by ceding the power of interpretation, which inheres
in the judiciary, to the legislature. 71 One judge attacks strict construc-
tion on the grounds that it can be used by anti-democratic judges to
obstruct the actual, if imperfectly expressed, "democratic will voiced
by the legislature. '72
65. In the words of Frankfurter, "The imagination which can draw an income
tax statute to cover the myriad transactions of a society like ours, capable of produc-
ing the necessary revenue without producing a flood of litigation, has not yet re-
vealed itself." Frankfurter, supra note 52, at 528.
66. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
67. Professor Griswold noted, "The whole job should not be thrown back onto
the draftsmen of the statutes. Their task can be greatly simplified to the benefit of us
all by a more sympathetic and organic approach to the problems of construing tax
statutes." Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should Be
Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1142, 1147
(1943).
68. See supra sources cited in note 52. "It is the absence of such a principle [strict
construction] which may enlarge the judicial power of interpretation into a virtual
power of legislation." Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 207, 213
(1917).
69. Radin, supra note 35, at 871-72.
70. Id.
71. Freund, supra note 68, at 208.
72. Frank, supra note 55, at 1262.
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Without wholly embracing any of these arguments, 73 one may
nevertheless conclude that it would be unwise to use the separation of
powers doctrine to justify judicial inflexibility in all cases involving
the interpretation of statutes.7 4 Dean Pound, in an article otherwise
highly skeptical of judicial activism, 75 made these refreshing and en-
lightening points about the separation of powers doctrine:
No one will assert at present that the separation of powers is part of
the legal order of nature or that it is essential to liberty. We
recognize to-day that it is a practical device, existing for practical
ends; that it is only the principle of division of labor applied to
government, and that it exists in modern states as a mere specializa-
tion, for the reason that any function will be better fulfilled by a
special organ than by one charged with many functions. It is often
better that some other organ perform the special function in single
instances, than that it go wholly unperformed. Just as in the or-
ganic body, when any one organ fails in its function others are
pressed into service to do its work as well as they may, so in the
super-organic body politic failure of one organ to do its whole
work, or to do it well, puts pressure on the other organs to fill the
gap.7 6
Some legal problems, admittedly, should be deferred by courts to
the legislature. When, for example, extensive study, research and
testimony are necessary to decide an issue properly, Congress is better
suited than the courts to gather the relevant data. Similarly, when the
resolution of an issue affects the competing interests of social groups
that are entitled to input into the process of decision-making, a legisla-
ture is usually the more appropriate body to hear all sides of the
problem and to promulgate a solution. Further, if a problem demands
a speedy and uniform solution, Congress, not the various federal
courts, is usually the institution best adapted to meet the challenge.
Whether to bifurcate a taxpayer's gain under section 1221(1) is an
issue that involves none of the considerations which favor legislative,
rather than judicial, action: The issue neither requires extensive legis-
lative study, nor involves a conflict among competing interest groups,
nor requires speed or immediate uniformity. The underlying social
policy, which is to afford favored tax treatment to capital gains, has
already been resolved by the appropriate government body, the Con-
73. The views of Professor Radin, for example, have been strongly criticized.
Dickerson, supra note 52; Landis, supra note 35.
74. "The proper office of a judge in statutory interpretation is not... the lowly
mechanical one implied by orthodox doctrine, but that of a junior partner in the
legislative process, a partner empowered and expected within certain limits to exer-
cise a proper discretion as to what the detailed law should be." Payne, supra note 55,
at 105.
75. Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 Colum. L. Rev. 379 (1907).
76. Id. at 384 (footnote omitted).
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gress. The only issue a court need decide in interpreting the definition
of a capital asset is under what circumstances, given the parameters of
the statutory language, a gain on the sale of property qualifies for
reduced taxation. 77
A number of decisions have endorsed a comparably flexible ap-
proach in interpreting the federal income tax statute. In Corn Prod-
ucts Refining Co. v. Commissioner,7 for example, a taxpayer bought
and sold corn futures on the commodities exchange. The purpose of
the taxpayer's future dealings was to ensure a source of raw material
for the company's manufacturing operations at a fixed price. The
Court conceded that the futures did "not come within the literal
language of the exclusions set out" in what is now section 1221. 79 The
Court nevertheless held that the purpose of the capital gains provi-
sions required ordinary income treatment for the company's profits on
corn futures because the futures were purchased not for investment,
but for business reasons.8 0
More germane to the issue of dual treatment under the section
1221(1) exclusion is the Court's decision in Helvering v. Owens,8'
which involved a taxpayer whose automobile, used only for pleasure,
had been damaged in a collision. The government, conceding that the
taxpayer was entitled to some deduction, disputed only the amount
claimed by the taxpayer. The relevant statutory language read: "The
basis for determining the amount of deduction for losses sustained...
shall be the adjusted basis .... -12 The taxpayer argued that this
provision entitled him to a deduction equal to the difference between
the car's adjusted basis and its value after the accident, which
amounted to $1,635. The Commissioner argued, on the other hand,
that the taxpayer was entitled to deduct a mere $35, the difference
between the value of the car before and after the accident.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held for
the taxpayer on the ground that the statute, by tying the amount of
the deduction to the adjusted basis of the property, required that
result.8 3 The court stated that to reach any other result "we should
77. In order to solve some of the problems in applying the exclusion in § 1221(1),
one author would deal liberally with the statutory language. See Bernstein, supra
note 20, at 1096-97 (advocates disregarding the word "primarily" in the language of
the exclusion).
78. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
79. Id. at 51.
80. Id. at 52. One commentator has stated that Corn Products "represents judi-
cial indifference to statutory language." Bernstein, supra note 20, at 1116.
81. 305 U.S. 468 (1939).
82. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 23(h), 48 Stat. 680, 689 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 165 (1976)).
83. Helvering v. Owens, 95 F.2d 318, 319 (2d Cir. 1938), rev'd, 305 U.S. 468
(1939).
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
have to disregard the words, and should not be interpreting them, if
we refused to take them just as they read. '8 4 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the proper deduction was the difference be-
tween the value of the car before and after the collision.8 5
Two aspects of the Supreme Court decision in Helvering v. Owens
warrant discussion. First, the Court rejected what a respected appel-
late court unanimously thought a strict construction of the statute
required-a deduction determined by the adjusted basis of the prop-
erty. Second, the Court effectively bifurcated the taxpayer's "loss" on
the car from its adjusted basis. Only that part of the loss attributable
to the accident itself was deductible; that part attributable to a de-
cline in value during the taxpayer's personal use86 was not deducti-
ble. 87
Other judicial decisions have exhibited similar flexibility in constru-
ing the Internal Revenue Code. 8 In order to obtain capital gains
treatment, the Code generally requires that a taxpayer engage in a
"sale or exchange" of a capital asset.8 9 In Commissioner v. Brown
(Clay Brown) ,9O the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a sale
had in fact taken place when a seller and a tax-exempt purchaser
84. Id.
85. 305 U.S. at 471; accord Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b) (1960).
86. Loss on the sale of property held for personal use is not deductible. See, e.g.,
Austin v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1962); I.R.C. § 262 (1976).
87. The Supreme Court has adopted a bifurcation rule without statutory authori-
zation in one other area of federal income tax law. Section 165(c)(2) of the Code
allows an individual taxpayer to deduct "losses incurred in any transaction entered
into for profit." In Heiner v. Tindle, 276 U.S. 582 (1928), a taxpayer purchased real
property, used it for a time as a personal residence, then converted it to rental use,
and ultimately sold it at a loss. The Supreme Court held that the predecessor of this
statutory provision permitted the taxpayer to deduct the loss even though the original
transaction, an acquisition for personal use, was not a "transaction entered into for
profit." Id. at 585. The Court did not, however, allow the taxpayer to deduct the full
amount of his loss, but only the difference between the fair market value of the
property at the time of conversion and the amount realized upon sale. Id. at 587.
Thus, the Court effectively bifurcated the taxpayer's loss into two elements, the loss
during personal use and the loss during business use, allowing a deduction for the
latter, but not the former. The Court dismissed the government's argument that such
a rule would involve administrative difficulties. Id. at 586; accord Treas. Reg. §
1.165-9(b) (1960).
88. The Supreme Court has, for example, superseded the ostensibly unambigu-
ous words of the statute by endorsing a sham transaction doctrine, Knetsch v. United
States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), and a business purpose requirement, Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), in order to combat tax avoidance abuses made
possible by a literal interpretation of the language.
89. I.R.C. § 1222(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) ("The term 'long-term capital gain'
means gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. ... ). Some provisions of
the statute waive the "sale or exchange" requirement under certain circumstances.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 331(a), 1231(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
90. 380 U.S. 563 (1964).
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engaged in a sale and leaseback transaction. Because the purchase
price was no more than a nonexempt purchaser would have paid for
the assets, the Court held that a sale had occurred and that the profits
on the transaction were taxable as a capital gain.
A subsequent case9' involved a tax-exempt purchaser which agreed
to pay, in a sale and leaseback transaction, double the amount that a
nonexempt purchaser would have paid under comparable conditions.
The Tax Court, distinguishing Clay Brown on the ground that the
purchase price exceeded the fair market value of the property, held
that the entire profit of the sale was taxable as ordinary income.92 The
Second Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the
Clay Brown decision was inapplicable only to the extent that the
proceeds of the transaction exceeded the price that a nonexempt pur-
chaser would pay for the property in an arm's-length transaction. 93
Although the operative statutory language does not even hint at dual
treatment of gain upon sale,9 4 the court bifurcated the seller's gain:
The part attributable to the sale of a capital asset was taxed as a
capital gain, and the part attributable, in a sense, to the buyer's tax-
exempt status as ordinary income.95
The foregoing analysis has established that dual treatment under
section 1221(1) of the Code is supported both by judicial precedents
and by accepted theories of statutory interpretation. A less traditional
defense of a judicial rule of bifurcation, based on economic efficiency,
follows.
C. Economic Analysis
This section establishes that: (1) An all-or-nothing, multifactor bal-
ancing test of the sort employed by courts under section 1221(1) is
extremely costly; (2) deferring to Congress for a solution to this prob-
lem may be inefficient; and (3) a dual treatment rule, in addition to
being fairer, is relatively efficient compared to the current test.
1. Inefficiencies of the Current Judicial Approach
a. Avoidance Techniques
A taxpayer who wants to subdivide or develop property to facilitate
its sale or to increase his profits upon sale runs the risk under the all-
91. Berenson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 412 (1972), modified, 507 F.2d 262 (2d
Cir. 1974).
92. Id. at 423-24.
93. Berenson v. Commissioner, 507 F.2d 262, 263 (2d Cir. 1974).
94. See supra note 89.
95. 507 F.2d at 268-69. The dual treatment approach of Berenson was followed
in a subsequent Second Circuit decision. Kraut v. Commissioner, 527 F.2d 1014 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976).
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or-nothing rule that these activities will result in a considerably higher
tax on his gain. He can try to avoid the increase in tax by conveying
the property for its fair market value to a separate but controlled
entity that will subdivide and develop the property. The taxpayer
hopes by these transactions to obtain capital gains treatment on the
sale to the controlled entity while the profits realized by the entity will
be taxed as ordinary income.6
These transactions generate considerable costs. In order to form the
entity, the taxpayer must incur legal fees for advice and for drafting
the requisite documents. Managing the new entity involves additional
costs, however small. Moreover, the entity may be attacked as a sham
by the Internal Revenue Service, which would then seek to disregard
the entity for tax purposes and to attribute its activities to the tax-
payer, thereby denying capital gains treatment for all of the taxpay-
er's profits.9 7 Alternatively, the government may argue that the trans-
fer to the controlled corporation was not a sale, but rather a capital
contribution, and may seek to tax the corporation on the entire gain
over the taxpayer's adjusted basis as ordinary income. 8 The taxpayer
(or his corporation) will incur significant costs in resisting such an
attack as will the government in prosecuting it.
The taxpayer has a less risky alternative to ensure capital gains
treatment. He can convey the property for its fair market value to a
genuinely independent third party who will subdivide and develop
the property for sale to customers. By inducing the taxpayer to take
this route to ensure capital gains treatment of the appreciation, cur-
rent law generates the additional transaction costs of arranging and
consummating a sale to an independent developer. In addition, a
costly economic misallocation may result if the tax "penalty" on subdi-
96. For more subtle tax avoidance techniques in this area, see Weinstein &
Corbett, Capital Gains from Real Estate after Suburban Realty Co. v. United States,
55 Fla. B.J. 333 (1981).
97. The Tax Court has held for the government in three cases in which the facts
were especially unfavorable to the taxpayer. Boyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 316
(1972) (sale to a controlled corporation at an inflated price); Engasser v. Commis-
sioner, 28 T.C. 1173 (1957) (taxpayers were real estate dealers); Kaltreider v. Com-
missioner, 28 T.C. 121 (1957) (taxpayers were real estate dealers and had personally
incurred expenses in subdividing the property), af'd, 255 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1958).
The Boyer opinion suggests, however, that a taxpayer may succeed in divorcing the
corporation's activities from his by selling at a price that would permit the corpora-
tion to make a profit on the venture. 58 T.C. at 326.
98. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. United States, 683 F.2d 365 (Ct. Cl. 1982). If the
transfer is construed as a capital contribution, the corporation's basis in the property
would be determined by reference to the taxpayer's basis. I.R.C. § 362(a) (1976).
Since the corporation is engaged in extensive development and sales activities, all of
its gain, including the gain attributable to the pre-transfer appreciation in the value
of the land, would be taxed as ordinary income.
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viding and developing in the form of a higher tax on the prior appreci-
ation 9 causes the taxpayer not to pursue these activities himself.
Normally, the taxpayer will subdivide, develop and sell the property if
his net after-tax income from these activities exceeds his net after-tax
income from any other activity. But by making subdividing and de-
veloping less profitable, the tax "penalty" may induce the taxpayer to
forego that activity which, but for the tax law, is the most efficient use
of his time. 100
b. Cost of Negotiations
A multifactor test results in expensive negotiations between the
taxpayer and the government when the two disagree about the proper
classification of subdivided realty sold by the taxpayer. By making
relevant many disparate issues without any sure guidance on which is
dispositive, the test requires both parties to gather and produce evi-
dence with respect to a multitude of facts.'10 Such information-gather-
ing and production is costly. For the same reasons, a multifactor test
makes it harder for the parties to predict the outcome of litigation. 10
An inability to forecast the probable result of litigation in turn im-
pedes the negotiation of a mutually agreeable settlement. The negoti-
99. More precisely, the "penalty" is the difference between an ordinary income
tax on the prior appreciation in value and a tax at capital gain rates on that
appreciation.
100. Assume that the taxpayer could make, net of taxes, $100,000 from subdivid-
ing and developing and at most $75,000 from any other activity. Under these facts,
he would normally develop the property because, in economic terms, his profit from
developing exceeds his opportunity cost of developing. But if the tax "penalty"
resulting from developing is $50,000, he will sell to a third party and pursue the
other, less productive activity because the tax penalty reduces his profit from devel-
oping to $50,000, which is less than his opportunity cost of developing.
There may be cases in which a landowner will sell to a third party even though the
maximum income he could earn from any other activity is less than his profit from
developing. Assume, for example, that the taxpayer could net, after payment of the
tax penalty, $100,000 from developing and that the most he could earn in any other
activity is $75,000. Given these facts, the taxpayer would normally choose to de-
velop. If, however, a more efficient third party could earn $200,000 from developing
the land and for that reason were willing to pay the taxpayer $50,000 over the fair
market value of the land, the taxpayer would be better off selling the land: His total
profits would be $125,000 ($75,000 from the other activity and $50,000 extra on the
sale) which exceeds what he could make by subdividing and developing the land
himself. In effect, the third party's offer has increased the taxpayer's opportunity cost
of developing from $75,000 to $125,000.
101. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
102. Empirical evidence strongly indicates that under the currently established
multifactor tests the outcome of litigation is unpredictable. See supra notes 31-32, 36
and accompanying text.
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ating process is consequently prolonged and the costs of negotiating
increased. 103
These arguments about the transaction costs generated by a multi-
factor test may seem to prove too much, for they suggest that all tests.
that weigh a multitude of different factors ought to be discarded
because they are likely to increase the costs of negotiations. A decision
to discard a multifactor test depends, however, on the availability of a
less costly alternative rule that is perceived to be reasonably fair.'0 4
Some areas of tax law preclude the adoption of a simple rule to serve
as a talisman in every case. Whether an activity is "engaged in for
profit,"10 5 for example, is a question that usually cannot be answered
by focusing on one or two facts. 106 Were a court, or Congress, to adopt
a litmus test in this area providing that an activity was not engaged in
for profit if the taxpayer showed no profit for three consecutive years,
the perceived sense of unfairness that might result from unswerving
adherence to such a rule would probably more than outweigh the cost
savings that the rule would undoubtedly produce. 10 7 Similarly, if a
court were to deny capital gains treatment to any taxpayer who sold
more than two parcels of real estate during any year, the sense of
injustice generated by such a rule would probably negate any benefits
in reduced negotiation costs. Bifurcation in cases involving a taxpayer
change of purpose is, by contrast, both a less costly 08 and fairer
alternative to the current multifactor test.
c. Likelihood of Settlement
By making the outcome of potential litigation less predictable, 09
the current multifactor test not only generates extra costs in negotia-
103. See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal
Stud. 257, 265 (1974).
104. For a discussion on balancing fairness arguments of a taxpayer against ad-
ministrative costs arguments of the government, see Yorio, The Revocability of
Federal Tax Elections, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 463, 486-88 (1975). One commentator
would weigh the fairness arguments of the taxpayer more heavily than the adminis-
trative costs arguments of the government in certain cases. Popkin, Deduction of
Traveling Expenses by the Two-Worker Family-An Inquiry into the Role of the
Courts in Interpreting the Federal Tax Law, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 645, 660-62 (1977).
105. I.R.C. § 183 (1976) (limitation on deductions for expenses attributable to an
activity "not engaged in for profit").
106. Treas. § 1.183-2(b) (1972) (nine factors listed as relevant to a determination
of whether an activity is "engaged in for profit").
107. The Code provides for a presumption in the taxpayer's favor if he has shown
a profit in two or more of the previous five consecutive taxable years. I.R.C. § 183(d)
(1976).
108. See infra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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tions, but also reduces the chance that a dispute will be settled." 0 The
all-or-nothing approach to capital gains treatment also reduces the
likelihood of settlement by raising the stakes in controversy: The
higher the stakes of a legal dispute, the more reason the parties have to
litigate rather than settle because the costs of litigation are proportion-
ately less compared with the amount in dispute.' In addition, when
the stakes of a legal controversy are higher, it may be psychologically
more difficult" 2 for the parties to move toward an appropriate middle
ground of settlement." 3 Since settlement is generally less costly than
110. This point may be demonstrated by a simplified example. Suppose the
amount in dispute between the government and Connor in the hypothetical pre-
sented in section (A) of this Part is $10,000 in additional taxes. If the parties know
that the government wins in 95 of 100 litigated cases, they should settle for approxi-
mately $9,500 assuming both are risk neutral. By agreeing to settle for $9,500, the
parties would approximate the average result of litigation and would save the trans-
action costs of litigating. Similarly, if the taxpayer is likely to win in 70 of 100 cases,
the parties would settle at a figure approximating $3,000. Not being able to estimate
the probability of a government or taxpayer victory makes it more difficult to reach a
settlement figure.
Since the parties may have different subjective probabilities about the outcome of
a case and different attitudes toward risk, the preceding scenario is somewhat unreal.
Nevertheless, generally the more information the parties have about the outcome of
litigation, the less dispersed their subjective probabilities of winning will be from the
true probability and the more likely they will settle. See Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399, 422-
26 (1973).
111. R.A. Posner, supra note 1, at 434-36; Priest, The Common Law Process and
the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. Legal Stud. 65, 66-67 (1977). This argument
depends on the apparently fair assumption that the costs of litigation do not increase
proportionately with the stakes in controversy.
112. This argument is based on an intuitive notion that the greater the stakes, the
more difficult it will be for the parties to move from their initial offers to a middle
ground of settlement. When the stakes are less and both sides have less to lose by
compromising-or win by litigating-it may be psychologically easier for the parties
to compromise. If, for example, the government claims that the taxpayer owes
$100,000 on the grounds that the entire profits on sales or real estate are taxable as
ordinary income and the taxpayer claims he owes only a tax at capital gains rate of
$40,000, it may be difficult to move to a settlement figure of $70,000 even if the
probability of either side winning is 50%. If, by contrast, the amount in dispute
under a bifurcation rule is only $20,000 instead of $60,000, both parties may move
more readily to a compromise figure of $10,000. The frequency of litigation on this
issue offers some empirical evidence that this intuition is correct. See infra note 114.
An American Law Institute study similarly attributes the frequency of litigation in
this area in part to the all-or-nothing determination that a court must now make.
ALI Draft, supra note 23, at 332-33.
113. For another argument that an increase in the stakes of a dispute increases the
likelihood of litigation, see Posner, supra note 110, at 419. Professor Posner demon-
strates that any increase in the stakes makes the plaintiff's minimum settlement
offer-the least amount he will take in settlement of his claim-grow faster than the
defendant's maximum offer. Since settlement is usually contingent on the plaintiff's
minimum offer being less than the defendant's maximum offer, an increase in the
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litigation, reducing the likelihood of settlement means that the overall
transaction costs of dispute resolution in this area will be greater." 4
d. Costs of Litigation
A multifactor test increases the costs of litigation itself" 5 because it
requires the parties to produce evidence in court on each of the factors
incorporated in the test. Admitting and evaluating a large volume of
evidence consumes judicial time and increases the costs of trial. "6 The
relevance of many disparate facts also makes summary judgment-an
obviously efficient method of legal dispute resolution-unlikely, since
stakes, by making the plaintiff's minimum offer grow faster than the defendant's
maximum offer, is likely to reduce the chance that the parties will settle. Id. at 417-
19.
114. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 103, at 265. Empirical confirmation that the
multifactor test engenders a great amount of litigation is found in a leading tax
treatise, which states: "These words [property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business] have given rise to as much
litigation as any others in the entire Code." 3B J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income
Taxation § 22.15, at 113 (1980). Judges have also commented, sometimes quite
vividly, on the frequency of litigation under § 1221(1). Biedenharn Realty Co. v.
United States, 526 F.2d 409, 414 (5th Cir.) ("The problem we struggle with here is
not novel. We have become accustomed to the frequency with which taxpayers
litigate this troublesome question."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); Gault v.
Commissioner, 332 F.2d 94, 95 (2d Cir. 1964) ("Because there is a good deal of
overlapping between business and investment property in this area, the cases are
legion."); Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1963) ("[The real
estate-capital gains issue is] old, familiar, recurring, vexing and ofttimes elu-
sive .... "); Kelley v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1960) ("[T]he case
law has grown to a jungle-like abundance accompanied by much of the welter and
impenetrability which such fertility produces.").
115. Somewhat paradoxically, a decrease in the costs of litigation may in some
cases increase overall transaction costs by making litigation more attractive than it
was. See Posner, supra note 110, at 418. Parties may litigate rather than settle and
this may increase overall transaction costs if litigation is still more costly than
settlement.
116. A multifactor test increases the costs of appellate litigation for many of the
same reasons. If, however, the appellate court views the question of whether the
taxpayer held the property primarily for sale to customers in the course of a business
as one of fact, as most courts do, see, e.g., United States v. Burket, 402 F.2d 426, 429
(5th Cir. 1968); Eline Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1, 5 (1960); contra
United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 910 (5th Cir. 1969) (multifactor test "has
factual underpinnings [but the] ultimate issue is inherently a question of law"), the
overall costs of appellate litigation are lower than they would be if the question were
one of law. Fewer appeals will be taken by losing parties because the appellate court
is unlikely to overturn a trial court's determination of fact. Also, the costs of any
appeal that is taken may be somewhat less because the appellate court need only
determine if the trial court's finding is " 'clearly erroneous.' " Commissioner v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960); (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)). See infra text
accompanying note 243. Even so, the appellate court must review, however curso-
rily, all the facts to make its determination.
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a genuine issue as to any material fact precludes the trial court from
granting summary judgment. 17
A multifactor test increases the costs of the legal system in another
more subtle way. Since the outcome of each case turns on a balancing
test involving a number of different facts, the precedential value of
any decision is lessened." 8 As a result, the legal system is missing an
opportunity to accumulate a capital stock of knowledge that can be
used to resolve subsequent cases. Although no two cases are exactly the
same, cases can be sufficiently similar that the legal system should
avoid the costs of a painstaking analysis of the facts of each. A multi-
factor balancing test makes duplication of these costs almost inevita-
ble.
2. The Inefficiency of Deferring to Congress
Conceding that a multifactor test is very costly, one might never-
theless argue that it is more efficient for Congress than the courts to
enact an alternative formula such as bifurcation. Two strong argu-
ments support this position. First, given the plethora of courts decid-
ing cases involving the federal income tax," 9 judicial change requires
time to take hold. For at least part of the legal system to operate under
an unfair and inefficient rule for an extended period of time is costly.
Second, judicial change of an income tax rule usually requires a
multiplication of litigation costs and judicial time, again because of
the large number of federal courts involved.
Although congressional revision of federal income tax rules avoids
these costs because it is speedy and uniform, it has its own costs which
are probably higher than the costs of judicial change. It would be
prohibitively expensive, perhaps impossible, for Congress to decide
every issue involving federal income taxation.120 Deciding which issues
to refer to Congress for resolution is itself costly. Empirical evidence of
this point is found in the rise of administrative agencies, like the
Internal Revenue Service, a development that suggests that statutory
rulemaking has become excessively costly in many areas.' 2' Even as-
suming that Congress had the time to consider and resolve issues like
the proper scope of the capital asset definition in section 1221, legisla-
117. United States v. Burket, 402 F.2d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 1968).
118. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 103, at 266-67; Posner, supra note 110, at
448-51.
119. Federal income tax litigation takes place in the Tax Court, the Court of
Claims and every United States District Court.
120. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra
note 103, at 280 ("We must also consider . . . the increase over time in the cost of
statutory rulemaking brought about by the fact . . . that legislatures cannot be
expanded to handle a rising workload without very sharp increases in the costs of
enactment.").
121. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 103, at 280.
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tive revision itself involves significant costs. The transaction costs of
obtaining the approval of the requisite number of congressmen are
high, even if the approval of just the members of the tax writing
committees is, as a practical matter, sufficient.122 Moreover, Congress
rarely focuses on a single issue in federal tax law; usually a proposal to
change a particular provision of the Code becomes part of a larger
income tax package involving complex political, economic and social
issues. Once that more inclusive process begins, it may be difficult to
reach a proper resolution of each of the relatively minor provisions
included in the bill.
Furthermore, the transaction costs of a change in the judicial view
of the section 1221(1) exclusion are probably not as high as in other
areas of tax law. Since courts frequently address the issue of the
capital asset definition, 2 3 judicial change can come reasonably
quickly and uniformly. In addition, since bifurcation is the fairest and
most accurate result under section 1221(1),124 the acceptance of a rule
of bifurcation by one court may soon induce other courts to follow
suit. There is, finally, no guarantee that Congress will ever act on an
income tax issue of this sort. By deferring to Congress courts run the
risk that the income tax system will continue to operate under a rule
that is both inefficient and unfair. The costs of such deference may be
high. 12 5
3. The Relative Efficiency of Bifurcation
Those scholars who advocate dual treatment in change of purpose
cases are concerned about the administrative difficulties that bifurca-
tion might entail. 126 Since the courts now employ a test that is itself
extremely costly,'127 there is little to fear from adopting a different
rule, at least from the standpoint of administrative efficiency.
a. Mechanics of Bifurcation
In order to implement a rule that provides for dual treatment of
gain or loss on the sale of an asset that the taxpayer held first as an
122. See id. at 267.
123. See supra note 114.
124. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
125. In his dissenting opinion in Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir.
1981), Judge Goldberg noted:
While the certainty of an erroneous solution may represent a temporary
comfort for those who embrace it, it may well represent an injustice for
those who are subject to it. When charged with a duty to correct a remedi-
able and harmful error in the law, judicial restraint can only represent
judicial abdication.
Id. at 1144. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
126. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 96-118.
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investment and then for sale to customers in a business, two crucial
questions must be addressed: First, when did the taxpayer's activities
with respect to the property change from investment to sale in a
business; and second, what was the value of the property at the time
of conversion? Although answering either question may be difficult in
a particular case, a 1960 draft study published by the American Law
Institute (ALI) advocating a statutory rule of bifurcation provides
guidance on isolating the factors that should be determinative in
identifying a change in purpose from investment to sale to customers
in a business. 128 The draft study recommends that, except in the case
of a taxpayer who is a dealer or a trader, 129 the time of conversion'"
128. See ALI Draft, supra note 23, at 26-27, 33-35, 94-96, 339-42.
129. Under the ALI draft study, a taxpayer is a dealer with respect to assets "if he
holds himself out as ready to buy and sell those assets or if he otherwise performs the
functions of a merchant or middleman with respect to those assets." Id. §
X1221(e)(2)(A), at 26. A taxpayer is a trader with respect to assets "if he acquires
those assets for the purpose of resale and engages in a significant number of either
purchases or sales of those assets." Id. § X1221(e)(2)(B), at 26.
130. According to the ALI draft study, if a taxpayer has always been a dealer or a
trader with respect to the property in question, his gain or loss upon sale should be
entirely ordinary income or loss. Id. §§ X1221(e)(2)(A)-(B), at 26, X1237(a), at 33-34.
Although a dealer should get ordinary income treatment, a trader, contrary to the
draft study's recommendation, should not receive ordinary income treatment on his
entire gain or loss on the sale of an asset. The draft study's recommendation perpetu-
ates the unjustified difference in treatment under current law between traders in
securities, who receive capital asset treatment on sales of securities, and traders in
other assets, who may receive ordinary income treatment. See Van Suetendael v.
Commissioner, 152 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1945). Compare ALI Draft, supra note 23, §
X1221(e)(1)(A), at 25-26 with id. § X1221(e)(2)(A)-(B), at 26. So long as the taxpayer
is not a dealer with respect to the assets, there is no reason to deny the taxpayer dual
treatment of the gain or loss upon a sale of his assets.
Occasionally a taxpayer will purchase an asset at a time when he is not a dealer or
a trader and will later become a dealer or a trader with respect to this type of asset.
The ALI draft study recommends that the time of conversion in such a case be fixed
at the earlier of: (1) the point in time when the taxpayer became a dealer or trader;
(2) the point in time when he made a significant number of sales; or (3) the point in
time when he engaged in substantial development activities. Id. §§ X1221(e)(2), at
26-27, X1237(a), at 33-34. In addition to denying the relevance of the taxpayer's
status as a trader, a separate determination of when the taxpayer became a dealer is
unnecessary because that point in time will rarely precede the time when he makes a
significant number of sales of property. See supra note 129 (definition of a dealer).
The ALI draft study also allows a dealer to receive capital asset treatment on the sale
of a particular asset if he can establish "by clear proof" that the asset is "not held by
him primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."
ALI Draft, supra note 23, § X1221(e)(3), at 27. Current case law similarly allows a
dealer to obtain capital asset treatment on the sale of particular property if he can
establish that the property was set aside as an investment. See, e.g., United States v.
Bondurant, 245 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1957) (cotton); Eline Realty Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 35 T.C. 1 (1960) (real estate). The Code specifically allows a securities dealer
to get capital asset treatment on a security clearly identified within 30 days of its
acquisition as a security held for investment. I.R.C. § 1236(a) (1976).
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be fixed at the earlier of (1) the point in time at which the taxpayer
made a significant number of sales of the property; or (2) the point in
time at which the taxpayer engaged in substantial development activi-
ties preparatory to sale.13 ' Once the time of conversion from invest-
ment to business is determined, the value of the property at that
time 132 would serve as the basis for bifurcating the taxpayer's gain or
loss upon sale into capital and ordinary elements: That part of the
gain or loss upon sale measured by the difference between the value of
the property at the time of conversion and the basis of the property is,
at the risk of oversimplification, capital; 133 any subsequent gain or loss
is ordinary.
Since frequent sales and substantial development activities are in-
deed the factors that reveal most clearly a change in purpose from
investment to sale to customers in a business, the ALI formula should
form the basis of a judicial rule of bifurcation. To be sure, either the
taxpayer or the government may argue that restricting analysis to
these two factors is inappropriate under the circumstance of a particu-
lar case. Although this argument may have some merit, a line must be
drawn somewhere. One of the advantages of a dual treatment rule is
that less depends on where the line of conversion is drawn because
some of the gain or loss will usually be capital, some ordinary. By
contrast, under the current all-or-nothing approach, so much more
depends on the outcome of the multifactor test that courts are rightly
reluctant to focus on just one or two factual issues. 134 A dual treatment
rule, by reducing the amount of tax liability that hinges on the out-
131. See ALI Draft, supra note 23, §§ X1221(e)(2)(C), at 26-27, X1237(a), at 33-
34. The ALI proposal would apply a dual treatment rule only if the taxpayer held the
property as a capital asset for five years prior to the time of conversion from
investment to business. Id. § X1237(a)(2), at 34. The proposal also allows a taxpayer
to "sanitize" development activities if he waits five years after such activities before
he sells. Id. § X1221(e)(2)(C), at 27.
132. More precisely, the ALI study sets the valuation date at "the first day of the
taxable year" in which the conversion occurred. Id. § X1237(b), at 34-35. The reason
for setting the valuation date in this way is to avoid the problem of having to
determine the exact date on which the conversion occurred. Id. at 339.
133. This statement is accurate when the value of the property continues to move
in the same direction after the conversion as it did before. Assume, for example, that
basis is 100, value upon conversion is 200, amount realized is 300. Of the gain of 200
upon sale, 100 is capital gain and 100 is ordinary income. Similarly if the basis is 300,
the value at the time of conversion is 275, and the amount realized is 250, 25 of the 50
loss upon sale is a capital loss and 25 is an ordinary loss. Complications arise,
however, when the value of the property moves in the opposite direction after
conversion. Assume, for example, that the basis is 100, the value upon conversion is
75, and the amount realized is 120. Given these facts, the taxpayer's gain upon sale of
20 probably should be treated as ordinary income since it arose after the time of
conversion. For a fuller discussion of these problems, most of which are easily solved,
see id. at 34-35, 94-95, 337 n. 18.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08.
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come of the test, makes it more legitimate for a court to limit its
inquiry to a few key factual issues.
b. The Advantages of Bifurcation
A dual treatment rule similar to the proposal outlined above avoids
considerable costs generated by the current all-or-nothing, multifactor
approach. Not the least important cost saving is that bifurcation
eliminates the incentive to devise costly and inefficient techniques for
avoiding the tax penalty which is now effectively levied upon the
taxpayer who subdivides or develops property to facilitate its sale. 135
Under a rule providing for dual treatment of gain, a taxpayer may sell
as many lots as will produce maximum profits and may develop as is
necessary to expedite sale, secure in the knowledge that these activities
will not taint the gain that accrued during the prior investment pe-
riod.
By focusing on three key factual issues 136-frequency of sales, sub-
stantial development activities, and the value of the property at the
time of the earlier of the two-a dual treatment rule reduces the
number of factual issues that are legally relevant on audit, in settle-
ment negotiations and in litigation between the taxpayer and the
government. 37 The parties and the courts no longer need to evaluate
disparate factual issues such as what proportion of the taxpayer's total
income was derived from sales of property, whether the taxpayer
employed a broker or used a business office in conducting sales,
whether the taxpayer advertised or engaged in other sales promotional
activities, and how much of the taxpayer's time was spent in sales
activities. The consequence of limiting the apposite factual issues to
just three should be lower costs of settlement negotiations and litiga-
tion. 38 Bifurcation does of course add to the mix of relevant factors
one issue that heretofore has not been expressly 139 significant, namely
the value of the property at the time of conversion. The Code 40 and
135. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
136. In an occasional case the government or the taxpayer will argue that the
taxpayer is a dealer and thus should not receive capital asset treatment for any part of
his gain or loss. See supra note 130. In those relatively few cases it may be necessary
to inquire into a broader range of factual issues to determine whether the taxpayer
"holds himself out as ready to buy and sell" or "if he otherwise performs the functions
of a merchant or middleman." See supra note 129.
137. See supra text accompanying note 28.
138. See supra notes 101, 115-16 and accompanying text.
139. Moreover, value at the time of conversion may be an issue under current law
because courts tend to favor the taxpayer's position if a large portion of his gain
accrued before frequent sales or development activities. See Freedman & Solomon,
supra note 23, at 299.
140. I.R.C. § 631(a) (1976) (taxpayer may elect to report as capital gain the
difference between the fair market value of cut timber-on the first day of the
taxable year in which such timber is cut-and the adjusted basis for depletion of such
timber). See ALI Draft, supra note 23, at 335.
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the cases, 141 however, address valuation issues in similar contexts,
without insurmountable difficulty. This suggests that the costs created
by the addition of a potentially controversial valuation issue are not
always high and would often be lower than the costs saved by the
removal of at least four other issues from the battleground of negotia-
tion and litigation in this area.
More important perhaps than the sheer reduction in the number of
relevant facts is that a dual treatment rule allows the parties and
judicial fact-finders to focus analysis on a few objective facts rather
than on the subjective intentions of the taxpayer. The multifactor test,
by contrast, attaches some importance to the taxpayer's subjective
purpose with respect to the property at three different points in time:
when he bought the property, during the period he held the property
and when he sold the property.142 Inquiries into a taxpayer's subjec-
tive purpose can be difficult and often costly because they not only
require a review of all those objective manifestations that bear on the
taxpayer's purpose, but they also call for testimony, by the taxpayer
and perhaps others, about his subjective intentions.143
Finally, a dual treatment rule increases the chances for settlement
of disputes between taxpayers and the government. Knowing that
only a few facts are relevant to the judicial outcome, the parties will
be better able to predict the probable outcome of litigation; the more
the taxpayers know about the outcome of litigation, the more likely
they are to settle. 44 By reducing the stakes in controversy, a rule of
dual treatment makes litigation less likely for two other reasons: First,
the parties will be less willing to incur the costs of litigation because
these costs will loom proportionately larger compared to the amount
in dispute; 45 second, with less at stake the parties will find it easier to
move to an acceptable middle ground of settlement. 46 This increase in
the probability of settlement will reduce the total costs of legal dispute
resolution.147
141. See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text. See ALI Draft, supra note 23,
at 334-35.
142. The taxpayer's purpose at the time of sale is usually more important than his
purpose in acquiring or holding the property. See Bernstein, supra note 20, at 1109-
11. But his purpose at those other points in time may also be important. Id. at 1110.
143. For a discussion of the problems caused by a rule that requires an inquiry into
a taxpayer's subjective purpose, see Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Ex-
penses of a Combination Business and Pleasure Trip-A Conceptual Analysis, 18
Stan. L. Rev. 1099, 1107-12 (1966). Professor Klein recommends a movement toward
an objective test as a way of eliminating these problems. Id. at 1112-18.
144. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 51
INCOME TAX RULEMAKING
In summary, a rule of dual treatment in cases involving a change of
purpose by the taxpayer is almost certainly 4 more efficient than the
current test: It eliminates costs associated with tax avoidance plans,
probably reduces the costs of negotiation and litigation and, most
importantly, increases the likelihood that the parties will settle rather
than engage in costly litigation. 49
II. SUBSTANTIATION OF DEDUCTIONS
A. The Cohan Doctrine
In the celebrated decision of Cohan v. Commissioner, 50 George M.
Cohan, the famous showman, had deducted a total of $55,000 in
entertainment and travel expenses on three tax returns during the
early 1920's. The government sought to disallow the deductions be-
cause Cohan was unable to substantiate the amount of any expense.
The Board of Tax Appeals, agreeing with the government, refused to
allow Cohan any deduction on the grounds that, in the absence of any
items or details, it was impossible to determine how much he had in
fact spent or exactly what portion represented nondeductible personal
expenses.15' The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Learned
Hand, reversed and ordered the Board to make as close an approxima-
tion as it could. -52 Justice Hand noted:
But to allow nothing at all appears to us inconsistent with saying
that something was spent. . . . The amount may be trivial and
unsatisfactory, but there was basis for some allowance, and it was
wrong to refuse any, even though it were the traveling expenses of a
single trip. It is not fatal that the result will inevitably be specula-
tive; many important decisions must be such.1 3
The decision of the Second Circuit had two principal effects: the
first, retrospective, in adjusting the rights and duties of the parties; the
second, prospective, in influencing the behavior of taxpayers and the
government in future situations involving travel and entertainment
expenses. With respect to the rights of the litigants, the Second Circuit
made two arguments on Cohan's behalf. First, the court opined that
the difficulties of recordkeeping for travel and entertainment expenses
148. Without detailed and costly empirical research, certainty about the relative
efficiency of the two rules is impossible, but the a priori evidence and the available
empirical evidence strongly indicate that a dual treatment rule minimizes costs. See
supra note 15.
149. See ALI Draft, supra note 23, at 334 ("[Dual treatment,] by facilitating the
settlement of controversies, will in the end simplify the administration of the law.").
150. 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).
151. George M. Cohan, 11 B.T.A. 743, 761 (1928), rev'd, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1930).
152. 39 F.2d at 543-44.
153. Id. at 544.
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for a person in Cohan's position were considerable. 15 4 Second, the
court decided that it would be unfair to deny a deduction for all of
Cohan's expenses when the government conceded that some deducti-
ble expenses had in fact been incurred. 55
Strong countervailing arguments, however, support the govern-
ment's position. Although recordkeeping for some expenses might
have been difficult, there is no suggestion that it was impossible.'56
The court may have been right that "[a]bsolute certainty in such
matters is usually impossible,"'' 57 but certainty about many of the
expenses was possible. To allow Cohan an approximate deduction for
those easily verified expenses was overly generous to the taxpayer.
Furthermore, Cohan's carelessness in making no effort to keep records
of any expense undermined his entire claim. For these reasons, then,
had the Second Circuit refused to extricate him from a problem
substantially of his own making, the decision would have been defen-
sible.
A more telling criticism of Cohan is that the court disregarded the
predictable and deleterious prospective effect of its decision: Taxpay-
ers now had an incentive not to keep adequate records of travel and
entertainment expenses in the hope that a satisfactory-or more than
satisfactory-approximation would be reached either in litigation or
in negotiations with government auditors. As a consequence of a rule
of approximation, taxpayers might even exaggerate their deductions
in order to achieve a favorable settlement or judgment. 158 The pro-
spective effect of the Cohan doctrine in fact proved to be disastrous. 59
As a result, Congress in 1962 amended the Code to effectively overrule
the Cohan doctrine with respect to travel and entertainment ex-
penses. 60 Nevertheless, courts, relying on Cohan, have continued to
154. Id. at 543.
155. Id. at 543-44.
156. Judge Hand may have exaggerated the difficulty of Cohan's keeping records
of his expenses. Conceivably there is a sociological, as well as a legal, explanation for
the chasm that separates the 1930 Cohan decision from the current statutory provi-
sion, I.R.C. § 274(d) (1976), which requires detailed substantiation. Perhaps it was
not so much difficult as incongruous for Cohan, a showman in the Roaring Twenties,
to keep close tabs on his entertainment expenses. It would have been almost unimagi-
nable, and certainly disillusioning, for a Babe Ruth, a Jack Dempsey or a Rudolph
Valentino to ask a bartender for a receipt after ordering drinks for sports writers or
film critics at a local speakeasy. Nowadays we almost expect our reigning movie stars
and athletes to be accompanied by their lawyer or accountant as they entertain, and
we envision the lawyer or accountant asking for a receipt on their behalf.
157. 39 F.2d at 543.
158. For a discussion by a former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service of
the problems that the Cohan doctrine caused, see Caplin, The Travel and Entertain-
ment Expense Problem, 39 Taxes 947, 958-64 (1961).
159. Id.
160. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960, 975 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 274(d) (1976)) (specific requirements for substantiating travel and enter-
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apply the "best estimate" rule to approximate the amount of other
deductible expenses.'"' As the next section shows, however, an approx-
imation rule generates costs that would almost certainly be reduced by
a rule requiring substantiation of expenses.162
B. Economic Analysis of the Cohan Doctrine
In a determination of which rule, substantiation or approximation,
is preferable on efficiency grounds, the rules must be compared from
the standpoint of two different types of costs: (1) the indirect costs of
legal error caused by applying the rule; and (2) the direct transaction
costs that the rule generates in administering the deduction. 63
1. Costs of Legal Error
The costs of legal error are the product of two factors: the probabil-
ity of error and the costs of error, if error occurs.' 64 A rule of approxi-
mation generates higher costs of legal error than does a rule of sub-
stantiation. To begin with, under a rule of approximation there is a
great probability of legal error because a government auditor or judge
must attempt to reconstruct circumstances surrounding expenses al-
legedly incurred some years earlier without the aid of objective evi-
dence such as a record of the time and place at which the expense was
incurred or of the amount and purpose of the expense. Requiring
tainment expenses). The Code also requires more generally that the taxpayer "keep
such records . . . as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe." Id. § 6001; see
Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1 (1981).
161. E.g., NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1981)
(ordinary and necessary business expense); Lollis v. Commissioner, 595 F.2d 1189,
1190-91 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); Cummings v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 675, 678-80
(5th Cir. 1969) (same); see 9 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 50.62, at
173 n. 17 (rev. ed. 1977).
That Congress has explicitly rejected the Cohan doctrine in the area in which it
was enunciated ought to encourage courts to reject it more generally. See supra note
46. On the other hand, Congress's failure in 1962 to require substantiation more
generally may be interpreted as acceptance of an approximation rule. This seems
unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, Congress addressed the one issue brought
to its attention in 1962, namely abuses of the Cohan doctrine in the context of travel
and entertainment expenses. Its nonaction in other areas thus should not be inter-
preted as acquiescence in approximation as a general rule. Second, the Code requires
taxpayers to "keep such records . . . as the Secretary may from time to time pre-
scribe." I.R.C. § 6001 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This requirement suggests that
Congress rejects the underlying rationale of the Cohan decision, that a taxpayer is
entitled to the benefits of the "best estimate" rule because it may be difficult to keep
records.
162. In the absence of detailed empirical research, it is impossible to be absolutely
certain that costs are reduced by a substantiation rule. See supra note 15.
163. Posner, supra note 110, at 400-02; Schwartz & Tullock, The Costs of a Legal
System, 4 J. Legal Stud. 75, 79 (1975).
164. Posner, supra note 110, at 401.
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substantiation, by contrast, would significantly reduce the chances of
legal error in disputes involving deductible expenses. Furthermore,
since taxpayers would be aware that the statute requires substantia-
tion, their tax returns more likely would be accurate, thus reducing
the chances of legal error even on those tax returns that are not
audited. Although some taxpayers may still neglect to keep records
and others may fabricate the required information at some risk,0  a
rule of substantiation provides a strong incentive to claim accurate
deductions and to maintain records that will reduce the probability of
legal error.
Not only is the probability of legal error greater, but the costs of
error, if error occurs, are likely to be greater under an approximation
rule. In addition to the usual costs incident to legal error, 6 such as a
loss in revenue resulting from an excessive deduction, the federal tax
system incurs a subtle, but pernicious, cost from the legal errors
caused by the Cohan doctrine. Because some taxpayers, by exaggerat-
ing deductible expenses,1 67 may profit from the legal rule that allows a
favorable yet unsubstantiated approximation of their expenses, other
taxpayers, who are scrupulous or who are not able to claim the
particular deduction, have reason to resent a system in which some
taxpayers are not paying their fair share of taxes. 68 Such resentment is
particularly costly in a system like the federal income tax, which
primarily relies on voluntary compliance by participants who, when
they see others cheat, may be induced to cheat themselves.16
9
2. Transactions Costs
a. Taxpayer Compliance Costs
A rule of approximation reduces the costs of taxpayer compliance
because it allows taxpayers to avoid the time and expense of keeping
records by offering the prospect of a satisfactory deduction without
165. The risk is that a court will impose a negligence or a fraud penalty. I.R.C. §§
6653, 7201, 7207 (1976).
166. For an analysis of the costs resulting from legal error in certain areas of the
law, see Posner, supra note 110, at 402-15.
167. For a discussion of the possibility that taxpayers may exaggerate their ex-
penses to secure a favorable approximation, see Caplin, supra note 158, at 961.
168. Id. at 963. A House subcommittee report stated: "This record-keeping pro-
posal . . . should reduce the risk that the great multitude of taxpayers who have no
substantial business deductions may feel that some persons . . . are not paying their
fair share of taxes." Subcommittee on Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws,
Report to House Comm. on Ways and Means 29 (1952), quoted in B. Bittker & L.
Stone, Federal Income Taxation 315 (5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Subcomittee
Report].
169. Caplin, supra note 158, at 947, 963.
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substantiation. 70 By contrast, overall taxpayer compliance costs un-
der a substantiation rule are considerable because they are incurred by
all taxpayers who may possibly claim a deduction, not just by those
taxpayers who happen to be audited. 17' Furthermore, the cost to
society generally increases with the taxpayer's income because the
more valuable his time, the greater the cost of substantiation caused
by his foregoing other activity to comply with the statute. 172 An
additional drawback of a substantiation requirement is that it may
cause some taxpayers to resent a system which, in their opinion, mires
them in a welter of bureaucratic details. 73 On the other hand, an
approximation rule also sparks friction between taxpayers and the
system because agents who do not get documentation of expenses may
be induced to delve more deeply into the taxpayer's personal affairs
and even to question his honesty. 74
b. Costs of Audit, Negotiation and Litigation
A rule that requires substantiation of deductible expenses ensures
that objective evidence will be available by which to determine the
merits of the taxpayer's claim. The availability of this evidence re-
duces the costs of audit, negotiation, settlement and litigation. 75
170. A taxpayer may deduct his out-of-pocket expenses in complying with the
substantiation rule. I.R.C. §§ 162, 212 (1976). The government therefore bears part
of these costs to the extent of a taxpayer's marginal tax bracket. Whether borne by the
government or by taxpayers, the expenses still represent a cost to society.
171. On the problems of recordkeeping for small businesses, see C. H. Gustafson,
supra note 6, at 379-80. It is possible to eliminate some of the costs of taxpayer
compliance by tolerating de minimis exceptions to a substantiation requirement.
Indeed, the current statutory provision that mandates substantiation for travel and
entertainment expenses authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regu-
lations making inapplicable some or all of the substantiation requirements in appro-
priate situations. I.R.C. § 274(d) (1976). The Internal Revenue Service has approved
a number of exceptions. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(c)(2)(7) (1981). Even with exceptions,
however, the overall costs of taxpayer compliance are increased by a substantiation
requirement.
172. Perhaps Judge Hand had this in mind when he allowed Cohan, a busy man
whose time was valuable, to get a deduction without substantiation. This argument
suggests that the higher a taxpayer's income, the less efficient a rule of substantiation
is. Of course, there is a built-in check on the costs generated by a substantiation rule:
A rational taxpayer will keep a record of an expense only if the value of deducting the
expense exceeds his opportunity cost in keeping a record of it. Furthermore, the
notion that high-income taxpayers have a stronger claim to an approximation rule
than low-income taxpayers is not only unegalitarian, but, if implemented, would
create substantial and costly morale problems among taxpayers. See supra notes 167-
69 and accompanying text.
173. See Cluck, How Cohan Works: Allowance of Business Expense Deductions
When No Exact Records- are Kept, 6 Rutgers L. Rev. 375, 401 (1952).
174. See Caplin, supra note 158, at 963-64.
175. It would be possible, of course, to design an approximation rule that would
substantially reduce the costs of audit, negotiation, settlement and litigation. If, for
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Under the Cohan doctrine, by contrast, the costs of gathering this
evidence and of properly investigating and preparing a case are sub-
stantial. 176 Moreover, a substantiation rule places the burden of gath-
ering the relevant information on the taxpayer while an approxima-
tion rule places on the government the burden of reconstructing the
taxpayer's expenses and of arriving at a fair approximation. As be-
tween a rule that puts the burden on the taxpayer and another that
puts the burden on the government, the former is generally more
efficient because it is usually less costly for a taxpayer with access to
the relevant information to produce it than for the government to
reconstruct it.' 77
Furthermore, a rule of substantiation, by making it more likely that
a claimed expense is legitimate, enables the government to operate at
lower cost by reducing the number of audits and by devoting less time
on audit to deductible expenses. 178 Moreover, under a substantiation
requirement, virtually all the facts as well as the fundamental legal
rule are clear. Thus, in most cases the probable outcome of litigation
will be predictable, which reduces the likelihood that litigation, a
costly method of resolving legal disputes, will occur.179 A rule of
approximation, by contrast, invites litigation because the facts are
uncertain and the judicial outcome unpredictable.1 0
Finally, a substantiation requirement eliminates the need for dis-
cretionary determination of the proper deduction by revenue agents.
Vesting such discretion in government officials results in significant
costs because it spawns opportunities for possible corruption in the
Internal Revenue Service.' 8 ' A heightened sense that agents may be
example, the Code provided that a taxpayer could deduct 5 % of his gross income for
travel and entertainment expenses without documentation, this rule would reduce
transaction costs substantially, but with considerable loss in accuracy. The Cohan
doctrine is not, in any event, a flat, easily administered rule since it makes an
approximation dependent upon factors peculiar to the taxpayer in question.
176. See Caplin, supra note 158, at 960.
177. In economic terms, the taxpayer is the cheaper cost-avoider of the costs of
determining the facts pertaining to his travel and entertainment expenses. For a
discussion of the cheapest cost-avoider principle, see G. Calabresi, supra note 1, at
135-40.
178. As a result of the Cohan doctrine, the most frequent issue at informal audit
conferences was the travel and entertainment expense deduction. Caplin, supra note
158, at 959-60.
179. For a discussion of the effect of outcome predictability on the likelihood of
litigation, see supra notes 102-03, 109-14 and accompanying text.
180. One authority commented, "[t]he Cohan doctrine has added litigious and
abrasive elements into our tax system." Caplin, supra note 158, at 959.
181. In a report to the House Committee on Ways and Means, the Subcommittee
on Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws recommended:
A second way to reduce possible corrupt practices in the Bureau [of
Internal Revenue] is to minimize the opportunities and temptation. For
example, under a leading judicial decision [the Cohan case], a taxpayer
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corrupt in turn adversely affects taxpayer morale1 2 and increases the
costs of policing government auditors and other decision-makers.18 3
III. THE MEANING OF "GIFt"
A. The Duberstein Rule
Commissioner v. Duberstein and Stanton v. United States, decided
simultaneously by the Supreme Court,18 4 raise the common problem
of assigning meaning to the term "gifts," which under section 102(a)
of the Code are excluded from a taxpayer's gross income.8 5 Duber-
stein was the president of an iron and metal company that did busi-
ness with another metal company, of which one Berman was presi-
dent. From time to time Duberstein would inform Berman of
potential customers in whom Duberstein's own company was not
interested. One day in 1951 Berman telephoned Duberstein to tell him
that this information proved so helpful that he wished to give Duber-
stein a present. Although Duberstein stated that Berman owed him
nothing, Berman insisted that he accept a Cadillac as a gift. Duber-
stein finally did so even though he had two other cars, one of which
was a Cadillac.
Duberstein did not include the value of the Cadillac in his gross
income for 1951, deeming it a gift. The Commissioner asserted a
deficiency. At trial, Duberstein testified that he did not think Berman
who claims large business deductions but has not kept any records to
substantiate the claim is entitled to a reasonable allowance for the claimed
expenses. . . . Stricter requirements for keeping of reasonably detailed
records by taxpayers would eliminate the necessity for discretionary deter-
mination of the proper expense deduction, and with it, any possible temp-
tation for the Revenue Agent to allow an improperly large deduction in
exchange for some private benefit extended to him by the taxpayer.
Subcommittee Report, supra note 168, at 29.
182. Id.
183. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 103, at 267. The elder Seligman makes a similar
point about a presumptive income tax: "Unless the presumptions are exceedingly
simple, the discretion afforded to the officials is liable to abuse." E.R.A. Seligman,
The Income Tax: A Study of the History, Theory and Practice of Income Taxation at
Home and Abroad 659 (2d ed. 1914).
184. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
185. The full text of § 102(a) of the Code reads: "General rule.-Gross income
does not include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheri-
tance." The problem of determining when a transfer in a commercial context is an
excludable gift has been alleviated somewhat by the enactment of § 274(b) of the
Code. I.R.C. § 274(b) (1976). Under this provision, a transferor generally may
deduct only $25 of the amount of a business gift. As a consequence of this provision
the transferor and transferee generally have conflicting interests regarding the classi-
fication of the transfer under § 102, with the latter arguing that the transfer is a gift
and the former arguing that it is not a gift. Since transferors will be less inclined
because of § 274(b) to make transfers that may be treated as gifts under § 102, the
problem of determining when a transfer is a gift will arise less often.
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would have given him the Cadillac if he had not furnished him with
information about customers. The Tax Court sustained the Commis-
sioner's determination on the grounds that the record was barren of
evidence revealing an intention on the part of Berman to make a
gift." 6 The United States of Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed. 187
Stanton had been an employee of Trinity Church in New York City
for ten years, serving as comptroller of the Church corporation and
president of its wholly owned subsidiary, Trinity Operating Com-
pany. After some reported ill-feeling between Stanton and the direc-
tors of the Operating Company over the termination of the services of
another employee, Stanton tendered his resignation, which was at
first rejected, but then accepted. Three weeks later, the directors of
the Operating Company resolved to award Stanton a "gratuity" of
$20,000, payable in 10 monthly installments, provided that Stanton
release the Operating Company from all pension and retirement bene-
fits not already accrued. Stanton in fact had no right to unaccrued
benefits. After his resignation, he was not required to perform further
services for Trinity or its Operating Company. The trial judge, sitting
without a jury, made the simple finding that the payments were a gift
and judgment was entered for the taxpayer. 88 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.18 9
The opinion of the Supreme Court in the consolidated decision,
Commissioner v. Duberstein,10 merits close scrutiny. The Court be-
gan its analysis by noting the "meaning of the term 'gift' as applied to
particular transfers has always been a matter of contention" and
"[s]pecific and illuminating legislative history on the point does not
appear to exist."'' 91 The government had proposed that gifts be de-
fined as "transfers of property made for personal as distinguished from
business reasons."' 1 2 The Court rejected this test, however, on the
grounds that "the governing principles [in this area] are necessarily
general" and "that the problem is one which . . .does not lend itself
to any more definitive statement" that could serve as a talisman to
resolve concrete cases. 193 The Court instead reaffirmed the following
broad principles enunciated in earlier Supreme Court opinions: The
186. Duberstein v. Commissioner, 17 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 16 (1958), rev'd,
265 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
187. Duberstein v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S.
278 (1960).
188. Stanton v. United States, 268 F.2d 727, 728 (2d Cir. 1959), vacated sub nom.
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
189. Id. at 729.
190. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
191. Id. at 284.
192. Id. at 284 n.6.
193. Id. at 284-85.
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word "gift" in the statute is used in a colloquial, everyday sense and
not in the common-law sense;194 a gift does not proceed from "'the
constraining force of any moral or legal duty'"; 9 5 a gift arises out of
"'detached and disinterested generosity ' 9 6 and out of "'affection,
respect, admiration, charity or like impulses." ' 19 7 The critical fact,
according to the Court, is the dominant reason that explains the
transferor's action in making the transfer. 198 In further criticism of the
government's test, the Court noted that the standard depended on a
set of presumptions' 9 derived from previous cases which, the Court
stated, are "not principles of law but rather maxims of experience"
subject to exceptions and qualifications. 200 Some of these presumptions
would be difficult for a trial court to apply either because the pre-
sumption depends on the local law of corporations or because the
presumption hinges on the resolution of a distinct and often complex
issue under federal income tax law. 20 1
The Court, in short, rejected all tests and presumptions and instead
viewed the assigning of meaning to the word "gift" as a determination
to be made by the fact-finding tribunal:
Decision of the issue presented in these cases must be based
ultimately on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experi-
ence with the mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the
facts of each case. The nontechnical nature of the statutory stand-
ard, the close relationship of it to the data of practical human
experience, and the multiplicity of relevant factual elements, with
their various combinations, creating the necessity of ascribing the
proper force to each, confirm us in our conclusion that primary
weight in this area must be given to the conclusions of the trier of
fact. 2
02
194. Id. at 285.
195. Id. (quoting Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937)).
196. 363 U.S. at 285 (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)).
197. 363 U.S. at 285 (quoting Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714
(1952)).
198. 363 U.S. at 286.
199. The government test was derived from such presumptions as the following:
"that payments by an employer to an employee, even though voluntary, ought, by
and large, to be taxable; that the concept of a gift is inconsistent with a payment's
being a deductible business expense; that a gift involves 'personal' elements; that a
business corporation cannot properly make a gift of its assets." Id. at 287.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 288-89. For example, to test the validity of the presumption that a
business corporation cannot properly make a gift of assets, the trial court would have
to determine whether the corporation could validly make a gift under the applicable
state corporation law. To apply the presumption that the concept of a gift is incon-
sistent with a payment's being a deductible business expense, the trial court would
have to determine whether the transfer was deductible as a business expense, an issue
that, as the Court noted, is frequently fraught with complication and difficulty.
202. Id. at 289.
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Although the Court conceded that this conclusion does not "satisfy an
academic desire for tidiness, symmetry and precision," it stated that if
"uncertainty or overmuch litigation" is a problem, "Congress may
make more precise its treatment of the matter by singling out certain
factors and making them determinative .... Until then, the
question remains essentially a factual one, the scope of appellate
review is necessarily limited, and the findings of the trial judge must
stand unless clearly erroneous.20 4 Diversity of result among trial courts
will tend to be lessened, however, "since there may be a natural
tendency of professional triers of fact to follow one another's determi-
nations, even as to factual matters. 20 5
In accord with these principles, the Supreme Court reversed the
Sixth Circuit in Duberstein because the conclusion of the Tax Court
that the transfer of the Cadillac was not a gift was not clearly errone-
ous.206 In Stanton, the Court found that the district court's unelabora-
ted finding that the transfer was a gift was so sparse and conclusory
that it was impossible to determine whether the finding was clearly
erroneous. The Court therefore vacated the judgment of the Second
Circuit in Stanton and remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.20 7
Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion concurring in Duberstein and
dissenting in Stanton,208 pointed out that the Court had granted cer-
tiorari in Duberstein and Stanton primarily on the government's urg-
ing that, in the interest of better administration of the income tax
laws, clarification was desirable in determining when a transfer was a
gift.20 9 Consequently, Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority for
missing an opportunity to provide useful guidance to lower courts:
What the Court now does sets fact-finding bodies to sail on an
illimitable ocean of individual beliefs and experiences. This can
hardly fail to invite, if indeed not encourage, too individualized
diversities in the administration of the income tax law. I am afraid
that by these new phrasings the practicalities of tax administration,
which should be as uniform as is possible in so vast a country as
ours, will be embarrassed. 210
Although Justice Frankfurter conceded that the statute does not "eas-
ily yield to the formulation of a general rule or test," he argued that
"greater explicitness is possible in isolating and emphasizing factors
203. Id. at 290.
204. Id. at 290-91.
205. Id. at 290.
206. Id. at 291-92.
207. Id. at 292-93.
208. Id. at 294-98 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. Id. at 294-95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. Id. at 297 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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which militate against a gift in particular situations. '2 1' In Justice
Frankfurter's own view, a transfer in a business context is presump-
tively not a gift while a transfer within the family is presumptively a
gift. 212 In accord with this formulation, Justice Frankfurter would
have decided against Duberstein and Stanton because neither had
rebutted the presumption that the transfers, both made in a business
context, were not gifts. 213
B. The Statutory Problem and the Prior Cases
Although it was interpreting language in an act passed by Congress,
the Supreme Court in Duberstein was writing on a relatively clean
slate.21 4 Congress's use of the general word "gift" and its failure to
define or limit it gave the Court reasonable freedom to fashion its own
definition. Furthermore, since the legislative history revealed no spe-
cific purpose for the exclusion,2 15 any result reached by the Court
necessarily could not be inconsistent with a discernible congressional
purpose.
Of the possible holdings available to the Court in Duberstein, the
following three appear to be the soundest solutions to the problem of
assigning meaning to the word "gift" in the exclusion.2 16 First, the
Court might have defined the term "gift" colloquially, as it did, on the
ground that in the absence of legislative guidance, a word in a statute
should be interpreted in its ordinary, everyday sense.21 7 Second, the
211. Id. at 295 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212. Id. at 296 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213. Id. at 297-98 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214. The only constraint on the Court was its own prior decisions, which, by
granting certiorari in Duberstein, the Court was presumably willing to reconsider.
See id. at 294-95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
215. The Court's view that the legislative history of the exclusion for gifts is not
illuminating is supported by an excellent article written a few years after Duberstein
was decided. Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income Tax: The Meaning of the
Word "Gift," 48 Minn. L. Rev. 215, 229-38 (1963).
216. Two other holdings are possible, but not persuasive. The Court might have
defined "gift" in the common-law sense of any voluntary transfer made with dona-
tive intent. But this definition would be too generous to taxpayers. See Blum, Motive,
Intent, and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 485, 490-91
(1967). See infra text accompanying notes 225-27. Professor Klein suggests a fifth
approach: "[A] court could consistently adopt the theory that the income tax should
be used to accomplish various social objectives such as relieving from taxation persons
thought to be needy. The term 'gift' might be construed, then, to encompass transfers
made for charitable purposes, judged as objectively as possible." Klein, supra note
215, at 260-61. Professor Klein points out some problems with this theory. Id. at 260
n.205. The theory is also unpersuasive because the conjunction of the word "gift"
with "bequest, devise, or inheritance" in the statute means that at a minimum the
typical intra-family donative transfer should be treated as a gift even if the recipient
is himself quite wealthy. See infra text accompanying notes 220-21.
217. See Klein, supra note 215, at 261. See supra text accompanying note 194.
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Court might have held that since no discernible purpose for the exclu-
sion could be found, the exclusion should be construed as narrowly as
possible. In so holding the Court would have implicitly accepted the
theory of some economists that the ideal of a tax on accretions depends
on a broad definition of income, 218 a theory that seems to have formed
the basis of the Supreme Court's then recent decision in Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co. 219 Third, the Court might have said that the
term "gift," especially when used in conjunction with the words "be-
quest, devise, or inheritance" in the statute, suggests a family or other
close, personal relationship. 2 0 The Court consequently might have
established rebuttable presumptions that a transfer within a family is
a gift whereas a transfer in a commercial context is not a gift. 221
One scholar suggests 222 that the Court chose the first alternative
because it was the most consistent with Bogardus v. Commissioner,223
the leading precedent decided by the Supreme Court. But the opinion
in Duberstein is in fact inconsistent with Bogardus in two of its
aspects. As the dissent in Bogardus noted, the majority in that case
relied heavily on the absence of legal or moral consideration on the
part of the recipient as support for its holding that the transfer was a
gift.224 In this respect the majority in Bogardus comes close to adopt-
ing the common-law notion that a gift is any voluntary transfer made
with donative intent. 225 The Supreme Court in Duberstein specifically
refused to import this notion into the income tax exclusion, 226 quite
properly because it could open the door to tax avoidance by enabling
businessmen to mask compensatory payments to employees and others
by treating them as "voluntary" transfers made with donative in-
tent.227 Furthermore, Bogardus held that the question of determining
when a transfer is a gift is a question of law or at least a mixed
218. Klein, supra note 215, at 260. See generally H.C. Simons, supra note 13, at
41-58 (discussion of the definition of income).
219. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). The Court in Glenshaw Glass held that punitive dam-
ages were taxable because Congress intended "to tax all gains except those specifi-
cally exempted." Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
220. For the full text of § 102, see supra note 185.
221. Griswold, supra note 41, at 89; see Klein, supra note 215, at 261.
222. Klein, supra note 215, at 262.
223. 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
224. Id. at 44-45.
225. The majority in Bogardus emphasized that the transferor was "under no
obligation, legal or otherwise" to make the transfer and that the transfer was "'en-
tirely lacking the constraining force of any moral or legal duty as well as the incentive
of anticipated benefit of any kind." Id. at 41.
226. See supra text accompanying note 194.
227. Professor Blum has observed that the issue in Duberstein is not donative
intent in the common-law sense, but "how large a degree of the commercial element
is compatible with a gift under the income tax exclusion." Blum, supra note 216, at
492.
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question of law and fact, 228 whereas the Supreme Court in Duberstein
held that the question is "basically one of fact" on which the trial
judge might be reversed only if his judgment was clearly erroneous. 229
Indeed, the five-to-four decision in Bogardus, which reversed the trial
court's finding that the transfer was not a gift, 230 would likely have
gone the other way under the "clearly erroneous" standard adopted in
Duber.stein.231
A respect for the principle of stare decisis, then, does not explain the
result in Duberstein. Why the Court decided as it did is unclear,
especially in light of the persuasive advocacy of Justice Frankfurter for
the establishment of rebuttable presumptions. 232 What is clear is that
the Court, by rejecting the second and third alternatives, reached a
result that was very costly for the legal system.
C. Economic Analysis of Duberstein
1. The Inefficiency of Duberstein
The Supreme Court stated in Duberstein that decisions in cases
involving the meaning of the word gift "must be based ultimately on
the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the
mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts of each
case." 233 The transaction costs of this approach are very high indeed.
By making every fact relevant, the Court invites the taxpayer to
gather and produce evidence on every facet of his relationship with
the transferor. If, for example, the taxpayer dined with the transferor
regularly, or their children played together, or their spouses belonged
to the same beach club, these facts might be relevant in determining
whether a particular transfer was a gift. When the taxpayer and the
government are required to produce and discuss a multitude of facts in
settlement negotiations, when both parties are induced to produce this
evidence at trial, and when the fact-finder has to evaluate and weigh
each of these facts, transaction costs are considerable.2 34
Also costly is the fact that the outcome of litigation depends on the
fact-finder's subjective judgment about the facts of each case. Con-
trary to the Court's optimistic view that diversity of result will lessen
over time,235 predicting the outcome of litigation is very difficult
228. 302 U.S. at 39.
229. 363 U.S. at 290-91.
230. The dissent in Bogardus took the position that the question was one of fact
and therefore would have affirmed the trial court. 302 U.S. at 45.
231. 363 U.S. at 289 n.11.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 208-13.
233. 363 U.S. at 289.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 101, 116.
235. Professor Klein argues that judges will inevitably reach results in this area in
accord with their own value system:
In an area such as taxation, different judges are likely to hold deeply
seated values that conflict to a greater or lesser extent with the values held
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under a nebulous standard such as that endorsed by the Court in
Duberstein. This is especially so when application of the standard has
been entrusted to numerous judges in the Tax Court and the federal
district courts and to juries that sometime serve as fact-finders in
federal income tax cases.2 36 Because the probable outcome of litigation
is unpredictable, negotiations will be protracted and costly, and liti-
gation, which is generally more expensive than settlement, more
likely.2 37
Another inefficiency of the Duberstein doctrine is that the legal
system is missing an opportunity to build a capital stock of knowledge
that can be used in later cases, for under the Court's mandate the
precedential value of each fact-oriented decision is limited.2 3 Lastly,
waiting for Congress to provide more precise guidelines on the mean-
ing of the word gift, as the Duberstein Court suggested, may also be
inefficient. 239 In any event, if it really sought legislative guidance, the
Court, instead of muddling through the language of old precedents,
should have articulated a clearly defined and novel rule that Congress
would find difficult to ignore.
2. The Efficiency of Justice Frankfurter's Presumptions
The adoption of rebuttable presumptions, such as those endorsed by
Justice Frankfurter, represents a relatively inexpensive solution to the
gift dilemma. By making it clear that one of the parties has a heavy
burden to overcome the presumption against him, that party must
concentrate on gathering and producing evidence strong enough to
rebut the presumption. He would be well-advised, therefore, to be
more selective about the facts that he discusses during settlement
negotiations and tries to introduce at trial because the quality, not the
quantity, of his evidence is more likely to be effective in rebutting the
by other judges. In these circumstances the results in individual cases may
reflect an implicit rejection of the arbitrary rule in favor of the judge's own
view of the proper goals of taxation. In other words, judges can be
expected to strive constantly to "make sense" out of a statute, in terms of
their own value system. This apparently has happened in the gift cases.
Klein, supra note 215, at 263.
236. That consistency among so many diverse triers of fact is a vain illusion is well
illustrated by a recent case involving the issue of whether a hospital resident was
entitled to exclude, as a fellowship under § 117 of the Code, stipends received from a
university hospital. Mizell v. United States, 663 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1981). Despite the
overwhelming number of prior cases denying the fellowship exclusion for hospital
residents, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict that the taxpayer qualified for
the fellowship exclusion. In upholding the jury verdict, the court relied heavily on
the Supreme Court's decision in Duberstein. Id. at 777.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03, 109-14.
238. See supra text accompanying note 118.
239. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
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presumption. 240 More importantly, a rule that places a heavy burden
of proof on one of the parties will reduce the number of disputes
between taxpayers and the government because parties with the bur-
den are likely to realize in many cases that their chances for success are
slim. Fewer disputes mean reduced transaction costs of negotiations
and litigation. In addition, since a presumption makes the outcome of
potential litigation more certain, settlement negotiations will be less
time consuming and costly litigation less likely.
3. An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion
Duberstein presented the Supreme Court with a golden opportunity
to fashion a legal rule that would be both consistent with the statutory
language and administratively and judicially efficient. Instead, the
Court promulgated an opinion filled with sonorous, but nebulous,
language that provided little guidance to lower federal courts. What is
most puzzling about Duberstein is that the Court seems to have been
somewhat aware of the economic implications of legal rulemaking,
for the Court apparently granted certiorari in order to clarify the
meaning of the word gift "in the interest of the better administration
of the income tax laws."'2 4 1 Indeed, the opinion in Duberstein itself
reveals a certain sensitivity to cost factors. In rejecting the govern-
ment's proposed test and the presumptions on which it depends, the
Court emphasized that some of the presumptions would be difficult-
and presumably costly-for the trial court to apply. 242 Similarly, by
holding that the judgment of the trial judge should be reversed only if
it was "clearly erroneous," the Court spared the legal system signifi-
cant costs of appellate litigation.243
Still, the Court reached a result in Duberstein that was very costly
for the legal system. With an even greater understanding of the eco-
nomic implications of its decision, the Court might have written an
opinion along the following lines:
The federal courts have been asked once again to decide whether
a particular transfer qualifies as a gift under the exclusion for gifts
in section 102(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. This issue has
always been a matter of contention. The statute gives us little
guidance as to the meaning of the word "gift"; the legislative
history even less. Given the dearth of legislative guidelines on this
question, it is not surprising that we find ourselves able to defend
any of three results. We might construe the exclusion very narrowly
240. Arguably, some taxpayers will react to the presumption against them by
trying to gather more, not less, evidence. At trial, however, the court may refuse to
admit evidence that is not relevant to rebutting the presumption.
241. 363 U.S. at 294 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
242. Id. at 288-89.
243. See supra note 116.
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on the grounds that it has no discernible purpose behind it; we
might define the word "gift" in its colloquial, everyday sense and
let the trial courts decide each case based on their experience with
the mainsprings of human conduct; or we might imply in the word
"gift" a family relationship and establish presumptions that a trans-
fer within the family is a gift while a transfer in a commercial
context is not a gift.
We take the presumption route. This result is perfectly conso-
nant with the statute since the conjunction of the word "gift" with
the terms "bequest, devise, or inheritance" in the statute suggests a
family relationship. A great virtue of this approach is that it will
enable the courts to decide most of these cases quickly and expedi-
tiously. This will save the entire legal system-and the taxpayers
who support it-a great deal of money. We understand that by
establishing these presumptions we give some taxpayers a smaller
chance of qualifying for a gift exclusion, 244 but the first solution
would be even less favorable to taxpayers and the second would be
tremendously burdensome, administratively and judicially. We
recognize the right of Congress to deal differently with this prob-
lem, if it chooses. Until and unless Congress acts, we choose a result
that is consistent with the statute we now have and which is
efficient in terms of minimizing administrative and judicial costs.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Avoid Multifactor Tests
An income tax rule that requires an evaluation of all or of a large
number of facts is inevitably very costly. 245 Admittedly, in some areas
of the federal income tax it may be impossible to limit judicial inquiry
to fewer facts because analysis of only one or two facts cannot serve, in
a fair and reasonably accurate way, as a surrogate for an evaluation of
all the facts in reaching a decision.2 46 Thus, before replacing a multi-
factor or an omnifactor test with a test that turns on one or two key
issues, a court must determine whether the cases under the statutory
provision in question are-or are likely to be-sufficiently homoge-
244. This proposed change from the Duberstein approach to a presumption rule is
an example of a change in the law that makes everyone better off ex ante, but will
make some people better off and some people worse off in the future. Specifically, the
recipient of a gift in a commercial context in the future is likely to be worse off as a
result of the change. Since, however, everybody benefits ex ante, rational persons
would choose the presumption rule because the odds are that they will benefit from
that choice. Cf. Tullock, supra note 14, at 663 (law of torts).
245. See supra notes 101-03, 109-11, 115-18, 234-38 and accompanying text. For a
criticism on administrative grounds of a recent Supreme Court opinion for emphasiz-
ing twenty-six, fact-specific criteria in a particularly troublesome area of tax law, see
Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure of Judicial Process, 66
Cornell L. Rev. 1075, 1100 n.128 (1981).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08.
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neous so that a simple rule will do substantial justice in the vast
majority of cases. 247 If the factual situations are expected to be fairly
uniform, the court then must be able to identify one or two common
issues that may serve as accurate surrogates for a more extensive
factual inquiry.
Because a surrogate rule raises the specter of possible injustice in
individual cases, it is important that the rule be perceived as fair and
accurate in the large majority of cases. Otherwise, the costs of per-
ceived unfairness or inaccuracy may exceed the benefits of the simpler
rule. With that qualification, a court should opt for a surrogate rule
over a multifactor test even though the surrogate rule may harm some
taxpayers. Indeed, if the cost savings of a surrogate rule exceed the
costs of its occasional inaccuracy and unfairness, a rational taxpayer
would choose the surrogate rule over a multifactor test ex ante even
though he runs the risk of being one of those taxpayers harmed by the
rule in the future.2 48
B. Eschew Inquiries into a Taxpayer's Motive or Purpose
Legal scholars have attacked income tax rules that require a court
to ascertain the taxpayer's motive or purpose behind a particular
transaction. One scholar has argued, for example, that the presence
(or absence) of a tax avoidance motive is irrelevant in many instances
to deciding how to tax a particular transaction.2 49 Instead, courts
should determine tax liability based on objective facts rather than on
the taxpayer's subjective motive. Another scholar points out that pur-
pose is often a difficult, elusive and ambiguous concept. 250 In cases in
which a taxpayer's purpose has changed over time, it is hard to know
the point at which a taxpayer's purpose is determinative. 251 Then, too,
a taxpayer may have a variety of reasons for engaging in a particular
activity; if so, it may be unclear whether having the desired (or
forbidden) purpose is alone sufficient or whether that purpose must be
a "significant" or "principal" purpose for engaging in the transac-
tion.252
Inquiries into motive are often costly as well as difficult. Con-
fronted with an income tax rule that necessitates the ascertainment of
247. See generally Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 103, at 268-70 (analysis of the
social costs resulting from over- or underinclusive legal rules).
248. See supra note 244.
249. Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 733 (1978).
250. Klein, supra note 143, at 1107-12.
251. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 103-05 (1972) (bad debt is
fully deductible only if the taxpayer's "dominant" motivation was business rather
than investment); Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1966) (per curiam) (exclu-
sion from capital asset definition applies only if the taxpayer's "principal" purpose
was sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business).
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motive, a court finds itself between the Scylla of placing great weight
on the taxpayer's own testimony and the Charybdis of undertaking an
independent inquiry into the taxpayer's motive. If the court were to
limit its inquiry to the taxpayer's testimony, judicial costs would be
relatively low: The court would hear his tale, gauge his credibility,
and base its decision on its intuitive reaction to him and his saga. Not
surprisingly, courts are rarely satisfied solely by the taxpayer's own
testimony,2 53 which may be biased, self-serving, even mendacious-
and yet convincing if the taxpayer happens to be a persuasive advo-
cate. The court's usual 254 alternative is to determine and weigh all the
objective facts that bear on the taxpayer's purpose, in addition to
hearing testimony from the taxpayer himself. The transaction costs of
such an inquiry are high for the same reason that a multifactor test is
costly: It requires the parties to gather and produce-and for the
court to evaluate-evidence on virtually every objective manifestation
that may reflect on the taxpayer's purpose. 25 5 In summary, since
purpose-oriented income tax rules are at times irrelevant, often am-
biguous and almost always costly, courts should adopt, whenever
possible, rules that avoid inquiry into a taxpayer's actual subjective
purpose.25 6
C. Minimize the Stakes in Controversy
A reduction of the stakes in controversy in a legal dispute increases
the probability that the parties will settle rather than litigate.2 57 Fur-
thermore, reducing the amount that hinges on the outcome of litiga-
tion makes it more justifiable for a court to avoid the costs associated
with an all-or-nothing test by adopting a surrogate rule in its stead.25 8
253. Blum, supra note 216, at 503-05.
254. Professor Blum has noted that a court, in applying a rule nominally depen-
dent on the taxpayer's state of mind, might base its judgment on methods of analysis
different from ascertaining the taxpayer's actual subjective purpose. Id. at 496. A
court may, for example, classify the taxpayer's action by judging whether it resem-
bles more closely one activity or another, or more closely fits one function as com-
pared to others ("comparative relatedness test"). Id. at 496, 501-03. Insofar as these
analytical methods avoid the costs of an inquiry into all the facts of the taxpayer's
case, they are economically preferable methods of applying a nominally purpose-
oriented test.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
256. The recent case of Mattes v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 650 (1981), is illustra-
tive. There the court allowed a taxpayer to deduct the cost of a hair transplant
operation as a medical expense under § 213(e) of the Code even though the taxpayer
conceded that the operation was undergone for purely cosmetic reasons. In so hold-
ing, the court emphasized that the expense was for a medical procedure to correct a
specific physiological condition. Thus, the court focused on the objective nature of
the expense, which was wholly medical, rather than on the taxpayer's subjective
motive in incurring the expense.
257. See supra notes 111-13, 145-46 and accompanying text.
258. See supra text accompanying note 134.
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One scholar has urged 259 that the deductibility of transportation ex-
penses of a combination business and pleasure trip should not turn on
the result of an all-or-nothing test, but instead should be subject to an
allocation, based on objectively determinable facts, between the por-
tion of the expenses attributable to business and thus deductible and
the portion of the expenses attributable to personal consumption and
thus nondeductible. 260 Although the transaction costs of making this
allocation may be high, rules that minimize the stakes in controversy
reduce total transaction costs by generating fewer legal disputes, by
minimizing the costs of negotiations and by increasing the likelihood
that the parties will settle rather than litigate.
D. Require Substantiation
A central feature of the federal income tax system is that it relies
primarily on self-assessment and voluntary compliance by taxpayers.
Although taxes must be withheld on certain forms of income, 261 each
taxpayer essentially determines his own tax liability. A political asset
of a self-assessment system is that citizens in a democracy participate
directly in what is a fundamental, albeit onerous, duty of citizenship.
Self-assessment also minimizes the monetary and social costs of raising
a large amount of revenue under an income tax. To begin with,
voluntary compliance by taxpayers enables the system to function at a
substantially reduced cost to government and, indirectly, to the tax-
payers whose taxes support the system. Although the costs to taxpayers
in their individual capacities may be higher, 26 2 a self-assessment sys-
tem is almost surely less expensive overall because taxpayers have less
costly access than the government to the information necessary to
determine properly their income tax liability.2 6 3 Moreover, the alter-
native to a system of voluntary compliance may be a system of direct
assessment by the government, which by comparison could be exces-
sively bureaucratic, intrusive and inquisitorial.
2 6 4
259. Klein, supra note 143.
260. Ordinary and necessary business expenses are deductible; personal, living or
family expenses are not deductible. I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 262 (1976).
261. See, e.g., id. § 3402(a) (1976) (employer required to withhold tax on wages).
262. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
264. The early income tax in Germany involved a system of direct assessment
which, though successful in raising revenue, was criticized by scholars and others on
the grounds that it was bureaucratic and inquisitorial. See E.R.A. Seligman, supra
note 183, at 262-65, 270-72. Indeed, one of the strongest objections throughout the
nineteenth century to the adoption of an income tax was that it would be an intrusive
and inquisitorial tax. Id. at 280-83 (France), 500-01 (the United States Income Tax of
1894), 659. For a modern, constitutional perspective on the potential for abuse by
government in the federal income tax system, see Berger, "Voluntary" Self-Assess-
ment? The Unwilling Extraction of Taxpayer Information, 42 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 759
(1981).
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The success of a self-assessment system hangs, however, on the
delicate thread that taxpayers are reasonably honest in computing
their tax liability. Ensuring the honesty of taxpayers depends on tax-
payer perception that cheating does not go unpunished and on tax-
payer confidence that other taxpayers are paying their fair share of
taxes. Income tax rules that permit taxpayers to receive deductions or
tax credits without documentation undermine the system in both
respects, making it difficult to prove conclusively that a taxpayer has
cheated and highlighting for honest taxpayers the fact that dishonest
taxpayers are able improperly to reduce their tax liability. 265 Approxi-
mation rules also increase the chance of intrusive and inquisitorial
tactics by government officials who, without documentation of a
claimed deduction or credit, may be compelled to inquire more
deeply into the taxpayer's personal affairs. 266 By contrast, a rule re-
quiring a taxpayer to provide evidence in support of his deductions not
only obviates the government's need to audit in many cases, but also
reduces its incentive to pry excessively when it does audit.26 7
E. Adopt Presumptions, Safe Harbors and Per Se Rules
A legal rule that establishes a presumption for or against the tax-
payer or the government, 268 a rule that opens a safe harbor within
which a taxpayer may plan with impunity, 269 a per se rule that makes
a transaction taxable (or not) regardless of the factual context, 27 0 all
are usually economically efficient rules. By limiting the number of
relevant factual issues, these rules minimize the costs of negotiation
and litigation. In addition, they reduce the likelihood of legal dispute
and the chance that the parties will engage in costly litigation. 27'
Legislative rulemaking of this type is more common than judicial
rulemaking,272 in part because some judges regard such rulemaking as
265. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
266. See supra source cited in note 174 and accompanying text.
267. See supra text accompanying note 178.
268. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 183(d) (1976) (activity presumed to be "engaged in for
profit" if the activity produced a profit two or more taxable years out of five taxable
years).
269. See, e.g., id. § 334(b)(2) (1976) (distribution treated as in partial liquidation
of a corporation, thereby qualifying for capital gain or loss treatment, if certain
specific conditions are met).
270. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 307-13 (1970) (redemption of
stock held by a sole shareholder always "essentially equivalent to a dividend").
271. See supra text accompanying notes 240-41.
272. For an excellent study of evolutionary patterns within the law of corporate
taxation that confirm this insight, see Clark, supra note 6. Professor Clark points out
that the almost universal pattern of development in corporate taxation is for a
taxpayer to develop a tax avoidance scheme, for a court to enunciate an open-ended
doctrine to combat the perceived abuse, and finally for Congress to preempt the field
with detailed and mechanical statutory rules. Id. at 94-135.
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a legislative function and in part because some judges are reluctant to
add detailed rules to an already complex and compendious statute like
the Code.2 73 But judicial decisions that adopt either a per se rule or
presumption avoid considerable costs in the application and adminis-
tration of federal income tax law, without necessarily violating the
language of the statute or a discernible legislative purpose.27 4 Courts,
therefore, ought to be receptive to per se rules or presumptions when-
ever a general or imprecise statutory provision generates frequent,
time-consuming and expensive litigation.2 75
F. Avoid Rules that are Traps for the Unwary
An aphorism of federal income tax law states that Congress and the
courts should not promulgate rules that operate as "trap[s] for the
unwary."2 76 Imposing a tax on an uninformed taxpayer that can be
avoided by a well-informed or well-advised taxpayer seems to discrim-
inate unfairly between similarly situated taxpayers. Moreover, if the
system values a rule so little that it allows taxpayers to escape its sting
by careful tax planning, the rule is economically inefficient since it
induces taxpayers to incur otherwise unproductive transaction costs in
order to avoid the rule.2 77
273. See id. at 95-96.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 234-44.
275. Although judicial pronouncements tend generally to be less specific than the
Code, see supra note 272, the Supreme Court has occasionally adopted rules that are
more mechanical than the relevant statutory language in order to quiet a particularly
turbulent area of tax law. In United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970), the Court
faced the recurring and vexatious issue of whether a redemption of stock in a closely
held corporation is taxable as a dividend, which may give rise to ordinary income,
I.R.C. §§ 301, 316 (1976), or as a capital gain. 397 U.S. at 303-04. Prior to Davis, the
issue had been litigated frequently, primarily because of the general statutory lan-
guage under which taxpayers claimed capital gains treatment and the government
argued for ordinary income treatment. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) (1976). A line of cases had
allowed a "sole shareholder" capital gains treatment on a redemption if he could
establish that the redemption was devoid of a tax avoidance motive and was sup-
ported by a business purpose. 397 U.S. at 303 n.2. The Supreme Court in Davis
reduced the stream of litigation on this question in three ways. First, it explicitly
rejected the prior purpose-oriented test. Id. at 312. Second, it promulgated a per se
rule that the redemption of stock of a sole shareholder is always essentially equivalent
to a dividend. Id. at 307. Finally, the Court stated that in all other cases the only
relevant factual issue is whether the redemption resulted in a meaningful reduction
of the taxpayer's interest in the corporation. Id. at 313.
276. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694, 702 (1947).
277. Section 1031 of the Code is a dramatic example of a statutory provision that
generates unproductive transaction costs. Section 1031(a) provides for nonrecogni-
tion of gain or loss on the exchange of "like-kind" assets, with some exceptions, used
in a trade or business or held for investment. Under this provision courts have held
that a taxpayer does not qualify for nonrecognition treatment if he sells an asset and
then reinvests the proceeds of the sale in a like-kind asset; to qualify for nonrecogni-
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Despite the aphorism, some important features of the federal in-
come tax in fact cause serious economic misallocations of this type.
High marginal tax rates, for example, lead upper income taxpayers to
embrace tax shelters in order to reduce their effective tax rates. 78
tion an actual exchange of like-kind assets must occur. See, e.g., Bloomington Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1951).
Courts have, however, allowed taxpayers to satisfy the exchange requirement by
careful tax planning. See, e.g., Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 794 (9th
Cir. 1963); J.H. Baird Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608, 615 (1962). In
a common scenario, B may own a tract of undeveloped real estate that A would like
to acquire in return for a piece of vacant land owned by A. A offers to exchange his
land for B's tract, but B refuses because he prefers cash to A's land. Although A could
sell his land on the market and use the proceeds to buy B's land, he would have to
recognize gain on the sale. As a result, A finds C who is willing to be a middleman
between A and B. A transfers his land to C on the strength of C's promise to acquire
and transfer B's property to A. C sells A's land on the market and uses the proceeds to
buy B's land, which C then conveys to A. The net effect of these transactions is that A
has B's land, B has his cash, and C, the willing broker, has nothing (except, perhaps,
a fee for his services). More importantly, since A has actually exchanged his property
with C for a like-kind asset, A receives nonrecognition treatment.
Although A has accomplished his primary tax objective, § 1031 and the judicial
decisions under it clearly generate an efficiency loss. Were A able to receive nonrec-
ognition treatment by selling his property and reinvesting the proceeds in a like-kind
asset, transaction costs would be relatively low because only two transactions-a sale
on the market by A of his land and a purchase by A of B's land-would take place.
Current law, by contrast, makes A incur additional costs in locating C and in
convincing him to serve as the middleman. This induces the parties to engage in
three, rather than two, transactions: (1) a sale by C on the market of land that was
formerly A's; (2) a purchase by C of B's land; and (3) an exchange between C and A.
Congress should address this efficiency problem. If Congress concludes that the
underlying purpose of § 1031 requires that both parties to the exchange have had a
genuine prior investment in like-kind property, Congress could bolster that purpose
by requiring for nonrecognition treatment that both parties have held a like-kind
asset for a minimum period of time before the exchange occurs. Such a requirement
would preclude a taxpayer from satisfying the exchange requirement through the
intervention of a third party who acquires a like-kind asset solely for the purpose of
an immediate exchange.
If, as is more likely, Congress concludes, in accord with judicial opinions, that a
taxpayer is entitled to nonrecognition treatment so long as he continues his invest-
ment in like-kind property, Congress should enact a provision that would enable a
taxpayer to get nonrecognition treatment even on a sale so long as he reinvests the
proceeds in a like-kind asset within a fixed period of time. Such a provision would
spare the system the otherwise unproductive transaction costs that a well-advised
taxpayer now incurs in satisfying the exchange requirement of § 1031. For an
analogous provision under current law, see I.R.C. § 1034 (1976) (gain on the sale of a
principal residence not recognized if taxpayer purchases another principal residence
within two years).
278. If government cares strongly enough about the sanctity of high marginal
rates, it can, of course, take vigorous legislative or administrative action to prevent
taxpayers from avoiding the rates by investing in tax shelters. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 465
(1976) (taxpayer allowed to deduct a loss only up to the amount "at risk" in certain
investments, primarily tax shelters). But the fact that a large number of taxpayers are
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These shelters not only consume economic resources in their creation
and management, but often generate less pre-tax income than more
productive, competing investments.2 79 Thus, in addition to the trans-
action costs of creating and managing tax-avoidance plans, the system
suffers a further efficiency loss if the activities fostered by these plans
would not take place in the market-or would take place to a lesser
extent-without the benefit of tax subsidy.28 0 The courts and Congress
therefore ought to be wary of any income tax rule that generates an
efficiency loss either by causing taxpayers to incur transaction costs in
avoiding the rule or by inducing taxpayers to purchase relatively
unproductive-but tax-favored-investments. 281
CONCLUSION
This Article has illustrated the contexts in which courts may use
efficiency criteria to help decide troublesome cases in federal income
taxation. Admittedly more numerous, however, are income tax cases
that should not be decided on the basis of efficiency criteria: when, for
example, the statutory language is unambiguous; when the legislative
purpose is clearly expressed; or when an overriding and conflicting tax
policy goal, such as fairness or redistribution, is at stake. But this
Article has shown that in some areas, the adoption of alternatives to
current income tax rules may be desirable from the standpoint of both
efficiency and fairness. Moreover, whenever a court's decision will
affect primarily the administration of a statutory provision rather
than its substance, cost minimization would be an important-often
the determinative- criterion of income tax rulemaking. Finally, the
still allowed to avoid high marginal rates through tax shelter plans may be a good
indication that society is ambivalent about the wisdom of high rates, in which case it
would be more efficient simply to reduce the rates. Of course, it may be that the
pretense of redistribution is consoling even when the reality is different. See H.C.
Simons, supra note 13, at 219. To some extent Congress has responded to this
problem by reducing the maximum rate on investment income from 70 % to 50 %.
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176-82;
S. Rep. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1981).
279. The investor nevertheless purchases the tax shelter because his net after-tax
return on his investment in the shelter exceeds the net after-tax return he would get
on a fully-taxed investment.
280. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
281. Congress, of course, may make a conscious choice to subsidize a particular
activity by giving it an indirect tax subsidy even though, or perhaps because, the
activity is relatively unproductive. Whether Congress should use the tax system
indirectly to subsidize an activity or should provide a direct subsidy instead has been
debated by leading tax scholars. Compare Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax
Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 Nat'l Tax J. 244 (1969) with Surrey, Tax
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with
Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1970).
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language of the Code is occasionally so vague or imprecise, and the
underlying legislative purpose so uncertain, that frequent and costly
litigation inevitably results. These circumstances usually justify judi-
cial adoption of a rule that will minimize the costs of legal dispute
resolution so long as that rule violates neither the language of the
statute nor a discernible legislative purpose.
